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Patrick H. Gaughan & Samantha J. Prince 
Facilitating Distinctive and Meaningful Change Within 
U.S. Law Schools (Part 2): Pursuing Successful Plan 
Implementation Through Better Resource Management 
18 U.N.H. L. Rev. 173 (2020) 
A B S T R A C T .  In Part 1 of this series, one of the current authors used institutional theory, 
behavioral economics, and psychology to explain why U.S. law schools have had difficulty evolving 
faster and better.1   The author then used institutional entrepreneurship to propose a seven-step, 
faculty-led, operational change process designed to overcome institutional isomorphism and to 
enable each law school to formulate a distinctive, meaningful, strategic plan.  In Part 2, the current 
article addresses the typical implementation challenges to be expected within the context of 
existing law school governance.  The article begins by discussing the Resource Based View of the 
firm and the role of resource management in achieving competitive advantages.  These 
considerations lay the foundation for the critical role of faculty engagement and law school 
leadership in successful strategic plan implementation. Next, within this context, the article 
discusses four questions whose answers may foreshadow implementation problems.  Lastly, the 
article discusses the results of several Monte Carlo Simulations.  The simulations provide insight 
into the likely performance problems caused by faculty misaligned with, or disengaged from, their 
law school’s strategic goals.  The results suggest that even minimal faculty misalignment can have 
a significant deleterious effect on the ability of a given law school to achieve any distinctive 
position. 
All told, the article concludes that U.S. law schools can successfully implement distinctive 
and meaningful strategic plans within existing shared governance structures.  However, success 
will be difficult to achieve. It requires the full engagement and leadership by both the faculty and 
the Dean, sustained operational support for strategic change, and the active management of law 
school resources. 
A U T H O R S .  Patrick H. Gaughan is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Akron. He 
earned his B.A. from Columbia University; M.B.A. from Trinity College, Dublin; J.D. from the 
University of Virginia; and his D.B.A. (International Business) from Cleveland State University.   
 
1  Patrick H. Gaughan, Facilitating Meaningful Change Within U.S. Law Schools, 16 U.N.H. L. Rev. 
243, 302 (2018). 
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I NT R ODUC T I ON 
A. Overview 
Undoubtedly, in recent years, U.S. legal education has been under mounting 
pressure to change.  The practice of law has changed.2  The needs of the public have 
changed. 3   The demographics of U.S. lawyers and judges have changed. 4   The 
geographic reach of the law has changed.5  The depth and scope of law in daily life 
has changed.6  The technologies used in the practice of law have changed.7  The 
demands upon lawyers have changed. 8   And, the market for legal services has 
changed.9 
Curiously, within the broader context of extensive environmental change, U.S. 
legal education has remained largely constant.  This relative intransigence is 
 
2  See Julie MacFarlane, The New Lawyer: How Settlement is Transforming the 
Practice of Law 2 (2008).  See also Ray Worthy Campbell, Law School Disruption, 26 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 341, 353–56 (2013). 
3  See Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law Students, the Public, and 
the Legal Profession, 44 Cal. W. L. Rev.  219, 220–21 (2007). 
4  See Gaughan, supra note 1, at 298.  See also Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A 
Demographic Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 345, 346 
(1994); Ashley Hart, Note, Sexism “Related to the Practice of Law”: The ABA Model Rule 8.4(G) 
Controversy, 51 Ind. L. Rev. 525, 525–26 (2018); Danielle Root et al., Building a More Inclusive Federal 
Judiciary, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Oct. 3, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/courts/reports/2019/10/03/475359/building-inclusive-federal-judiciary/ [https://perma.cc/
NU5W-L8TE] (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).  But see Steven A. Ramirez, Foreword: Diversity in the Legal 
Academy After Fisher II, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 979, 980 (2017). 
5  See generally Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Borders: Law, Politics, and U.S. 
Extraterritoriality 6 (2016); Patrick Emmenegger & Katrin Eggenberger, State Sovereignty, 
Economic Interdependence and US Extraterritoriality: The Demise of Swiss Banking Secrecy and the Re-
embedding of International Finance, 21 J. Int’l Rel. 798 (2018). 
6  See generally Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (2d ed. 
2019). 
7  See John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will 
Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 3041, 3041 (2014).  
See also Richard K. Sherwin et al., Law in the Digital Age: How Visual Communication Technologies are 
Transforming the Practice, Theory, and Teaching of Law, 12 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 227, 227 (2006). 
8  See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., The Part-Time Paradox: Time Norms, Professional 
Life, Family and Gender 3 (2014).  See also Cheryl Krause & Jane Chong, Lawyer Wellbeing as a 
Crisis of the Profession, 71 U. S.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3464992 
[https://perma.cc/2V2M-YDCF] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
9  See Gaughan, supra note 1, at 259.  See also Campbell, supra note 2, at 355. 
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especially surprising given that the external legal environment has created 
numerous opportunities for U.S. law schools to differentiate their offerings and to 
provide unique value.10  Instead, most U.S. law schools (particularly those ranked in 
the middle tier) have remained largely preoccupied with supporting traditional 
roles and copying the practices of their peer institutions.11  
As explained in the earlier article,12 the failure of U.S. law schools to evolve faster 
and better is not caused by any inherent stubbornness.  But rather, without careful 
planning and active support for change, law school innovation is defeated by 
multiple institutional forces.13  Without informed and carefully managed processes, 
U.S. law schools tend to fixate on complying with peer expectations, complaining 
about the U.S. News and World Report rankings, and meeting the demands of 
various vested interests.  With numerous interconnected but often conflicted 
stakeholders (including the ABA accreditation requirements), it is understandably 
difficult for U.S. law schools to evolve. 14   U.S. legal education is highly 
institutionalized.15 
Of course, the first casualty of institutionalized legal education is not any 
individual law school. The first casualty is the external utility—or value—of the legal 
education to the “outside” world. 16   By failing to better adapt to the changing 
external wants and needs of society, institutionalization directly undermines the 
value of a legal education to potential applicants.  It also indirectly victimizes other 
members of society left with unserved—or underserved—legal needs.  
Unfortunately, institutionalized industries rarely adapt well to the evolving needs 
 
10  See Gaughan, supra note 1, at 266–69 (introducing the VRIO framework as a tool to determine 
how, within existing and potential resources, a given firm can create unique value). 
11  Id. at 257–58 (establishing resistance to change as an institutional problem among law 
schools). 
12  Id. at 302. 
13  Id. at 258. 
14  Id. at 256–57.  Some researchers believe that the ABA accreditation standards should either 
be abolished or relaxed as they require law schools to fit into a certain model thereby repressing 
the ability of law schools to innovate.  See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools 172–77 
(2012). 
15  See Gaughan, supra note 1, at 255.  Cf. Benjamin H. Barton, Fixing Law Schools: From 
Collapse to the Trump Bump and Beyond 188–92 (2019). 
16  See Gaughan, supra note 1, at 255 (“As a field evolves, constituent organizations tend to 
increasingly align and incorporate common meanings in reference to each other.  In the process, 
organizational focus tends to shift from competitively serving the needs of the external market to 
simply integrating the organization into the collective expectations of the field.”).  See also 
Campbell, supra note 2, at 364–65. 
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of their putative constituents.  U.S. legal education is no exception. 
The initial question, answered in the earlier article, therefore was what U.S. law 
schools could do within existing frameworks to overcome institutional 
isomorphism and to formulate effective, distinctive and meaningful strategies.17  
The present article takes this effort one step further.  It provides a theoretical 
foundation for how U.S. law schools can successfully implement their strategic 
plans.18  
The present article begins by discussing the Resource Based View of the firm 
and the role of resource management in achieving competitive advantages.  These 
considerations lay the foundation for the critical role of faculty engagement and law 
school leadership in successful strategic plan implementation.  Next, the article 
discusses four questions whose answers may foreshadow implementation 
problems.  Lastly, the article uses several Monte Carlo Simulations to examine the 
potential impact of misaligned or disengaged faculty on law school performance.  
These results provide insight into the challenges facing law schools in successfully 
implementing their strategic plans.  Of course, before addressing these issues, it is 
first necessary to briefly review the key output of the earlier article: The Seven-Stage 
Process for Meaningful Change. 
B. The Seven-Stage Process and The Implementation Challenge 
In the earlier article, after having described the institutional and psychological 
sources of resistance to change, a seven-stage process was proposed to facilitate the 
development of distinctive, meaningful, law school strategies.  The seven-stage 
process addressed faculty engagement and leadership concerns by intentionally 
utilizing a faculty-led process with input from the Dean.  The proposed seven-stage 
process is outlined below:  
 
 
17  By way of further clarification, the scope of both the earlier and current article is 
intentionally limited to innovation generally within existing law school governance structures.  
The presumption is that timely corrective actions will have an opportunity to be both successfully 
implemented as well as reap the desired benefits. 
18  It is contemplated that future articles will: 1) obtain and analyze empirical data upon which 
to further refine the processes discussed in the first two articles; and/or 2) address the methods 
by which institutionalization and isomorphism might be overcome through industry-wide 
reforms rather than just through the efforts of some individual law schools. 
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19 
 
In Stage 1 of the process, the Dean selects a small “seed” group of widely-
respected law faculty to manage the overall process.  By design, the Dean empowers 
the widely-respected faculty (called “Conveners”) with support and commitment to 
achieve meaningful change.20  
In Stage 2, the Conveners “convene” the entire law faculty to facilitate grass-
roots support and engagement in the entire process.21  Another goal of Stage 2 is to 
identify and address, as early as possible, faculty concerns and sources of resistance.  
Yet another goal is to obtain a commitment from the entire faculty to implement 
some number of proposals expected to result from the overall process. 
In Stage 3, the Conveners delegate and empower a hand-selected group of 
internal, client-facing, law school personnel (Innovators).  The Conveners also 
engage a group of external stakeholders who are supportive of the individual law 
school and might have access to additional resources (Catalysts).  Together, the 
Innovators and Catalysts systematically identify law school opportunities for 
distinctive and meaningful change.22  The opportunities—as determined from the 
perspective of potential applicants to the specific law school—are evaluated on the 
basis of being valuable, rare, inimitable (or imperfectly imitable), and 
organizationally appropriate.23 
In Stage 4, all the teams (Conveners, Innovators, and Catalysts) work with the 
Dean to prioritize the identified opportunities.  An additional purpose of Stage 4 is 
 
19  Gaughan, supra note 1, at 288. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. at 289. 
22  Id. at 296. 
23  Id. at 295. 
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to establish a base-level of consensus among the active participants regarding the 
identified opportunities prior to proceeding to Stage 5.24  
In Stage 5, the Conveners re-convene the entire law faculty in order to present, 
explain, and obtain formal faculty support for the adoption of a finite number of the 
prioritized distinctive opportunities.25  In essence, the faculty is asked to adopt and 
support a strategic plan. 
Up until this point in the process, the primary source of faculty leadership has 
been the conscious delegation of support by the Dean and the engagement of a 
group of widely-respected law faculty leaders (the Conveners).  If done properly, the 
completion of Stages 1-5 should result in a distinctive and meaningful strategy that 
has been tailored to the unique resources and potential market for the individual 
law school. 
In Stage 6, the Dean takes primary responsibility (along with the Innovators) to 
begin the operational implementation of the adopted strategies.  It is presumed that 
the Conveners remain engaged to maintain the broader faculty engagement and 
momentum.  The intention of Stage 6 is to begin actually pursuing unique 
opportunities through the implementation of the adopted strategic plan. 26  
However, given the limitations of time and space, the first article largely glossed 
over the likely operational challenges and pitfalls that could be expected during the 
implementation process.  This is part of the focus of the current article. 
Lastly, in Stage 7 of the process model, the Dean resets the overall process and 
adjusts for anything that would improve future efforts. 27   Again, due to the 
limitations of time and space, the first article largely glossed over the role of 
managing law school resources in support of future growth.  This too is a focus of 
the current article. 
Although the seven-stage process is (and remains) appropriate, the earlier 
article did very little to analyze the processes necessary to successfully implement the 
resulting strategic plan (Stage 6).  The earlier article also did not seek to explain how, 
over time, individual law schools can adjust their resources to better align with 
future opportunities while resetting the entire process (Stage 7).  For these reasons, 
the current article seeks to clarify and refine these issues.  This necessarily begins 
with focusing on implementation through improved resource management.  
 
24  Id. at 299. 
25  Id. at 300. 
26  Id. at 301. 
27  Id. at 301–02. 
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I .  P UR S UI NG S UC C E S S F UL  P L AN I MP L E ME N T AT I ON  T HR OUGH B E T T E R  
R E S OUR C E  MANAGE ME NT 
Notwithstanding the effort and careful thought of any strategic planning 
initiative, it would be a huge mistake to assume that the implementation of the 
resulting strategic plan will be either easy or successful—especially in the context of 
U.S. law schools28:  
 Formulating strategy is difficult.  [But] making strategy work—executing or 
implementing it throughout an organization—is even more difficult.  Without effective 
implementation, no . . . strategy can succeed.29  
Implementations fail for different reasons.  The execution of any strategic plan 
usually requires the broader participation by more individuals across the 
organization than during the strategy formulation process.30  The execution of most 
strategic plans usually takes more time and therefore requires a more sustained 
organizational effort. 31   The process of plan implementation also involves the 
inherent interaction between the internally formulated strategic plan and the 
realities of the external world.32  The implementation of strategic plans also can 
conflict with aspects of the existing organizational culture.33  And on top of all of 
this, within the academic context, implementation involves “trying to manage 
faculty members . . .  like herding cats.”34  The critical question—and stated purpose 
of the current article—is how U.S. law schools can best implement an otherwise 
appropriate strategic plan while avoiding common implementation pitfalls? The 
answer to this question begins by considering the theoretical foundation 
underlying any implementation process.  
 
28  Nancy B. Rapoport, Eating Our Cake and Having it, too: Why Real Change is so Difficult in Law 
Schools, 81 Ind. L.J. 359, 359–60 (2006). 
29  Lawrence G. Hrebiniak, Obstacles to Effective Strategy Implementation, 35 Organizational 
Dynamics 12, 12 (2006). 
30  Id. at 14. 
31  Id. 
32  Id.  
33  See Amarjeev Kaul, Culture vs Strategy: Which to Precede, Which to Align?, 12 J. of Strategy and 
Mgmt. 116, 119 (2019).  See also Anna Pietruszka-Ortyl, The Impact of Organizational Culture for 
Company's Innovation Strategy, 3 Mktg. and Mgmt. of Innovations 178, 178 (2019). 
34  John McCormack et al., Herding Cats? Management and University Performance, 124 The Econ. 
J. F534, F534 (2014).  See also Nancy B. Rapoport, Of Cat-herders, Conductors, Tour Guides, and Fearless 
Leaders, 33 U. Tol. L. Rev. 161, 163 (2001). 
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A. The Theoretical Foundation for Managing the Implementation Process 
As an initial matter, the reality is that the successful implementation of any 
strategic plan revolves around the deployment of resources.  At some level within an 
organization, resource management provides the common nexus between the day-
to-day operations and the implementation of organizational strategy.  As a result, 
resource management is integral to both meeting operational demands and the 
ability to realize the benefits of any distinctive and meaningful strategy. 35  
Moreover, given that the resources of U.S. law schools are almost always greatly 
limited, the ability to prioritize and coordinate resources is critical.  Accordingly, it 
is submitted that the Resource Based View provides the best theoretical framework 
for any implementation effort. 
1. The Resource Based View 
According to the Resource Based View, a law school—just like any other firm—
“is basically a collection of resources.”36  
Strictly speaking, it is never [the] resources themselves that are the ‘inputs’ in the 
production process, but only the services that the resources can render.  The services 
yielded by resources are a function of the way in which they are used—exactly the same 
resource when used for different purposes or in different ways and in combination with 
different types or amounts of other resources provides a different service or set of 
services . . . it is largely in this distinction that we find the source of the uniqueness of 
each individual firm.37 
According to the Resource Based View, even if all law schools were to begin with 
identical resources, one or more law schools could still achieve a sustainable 
competitive advantage simply by being either more efficient or effective (or both) 
in strategically deploying their resources.38  It is possible to simply “out manage” 
competitors by being better at deploying, developing, acquiring and disposing of 
resources.39  This applies equally to a law school’s ability to successfully implement 
 
35  Rick Staisloff, Want Breakthroughs that Last? Consider Your Business Model, Chron. of Higher 
Educ. 45 (Oct. 23, 2016) (“Once an institution has identified its economic engines (the programs 
and services that make the largest contribution to financial sustainability), it can direct resources 
toward them and to its strategic academic and financial goals.”). 
36  Edith Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm 68 (4th ed. 2009). 
37  Id. at 22. 
38  A similar argument has been advanced through something called Resource-Advantage 
Theory.  See, e.g., Shelby D. Hunt & Robert M. Morgan, Resource-Advantage Theory: A Snake 
Swallowing Its Tail or a General Theory of Competition?, 61 J. of Mktg. 74, 78 (1997). 
39  Cf. Christos N. Pitelis, Introduction to Edith Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the 
Firm ix, xviii (4th ed. 2009). 
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a strategic plan. 
Undoubtedly, all law schools inherently serve the same basic, noble, purpose. 
They provide their law students with a means for learning about the law and of 
ultimately passing the bar exam.  This is inherent in the ABA accreditation 
standards.40  However, these attributes alone are not sufficient to assure the success 
of any particular law school. If all law school resources were expended only on 
assuring bar exam passage, a particular law school would be unlikely to provide any 
unique value.  The education supplied by the particular school would be a 
commodity.  More is necessary.  Individual law schools must identify the subtle 
differences in the wants and needs of potential law school applicants—and then 
determine how to best manage the law school resources to serve these particular 
groups better than others. 
Although law schools have little control over the extent of their starting 
resources or the external environment in which they operate, individual law schools 
have significant control over how they develop and deploy the resources under their 
control.41  Even within the context of academic institutions, recent studies suggest 
that the appropriate management of faculty can lead to improved departmental 
performance.42  Other studies have shown that improved management of faculty 
can even improve the quality of the education provided. 43   Improved resource 
management therefore provides a substantive means by which an individual law 
school can deliver distinct value to a specific group of potential law students.  It is a 
 
40  See, e.g., Program of Legal Education, Standard 301(a), Objectives of Program of Legal Education, 
2019–2020 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools  ch. 3 (stating 
“A law school shall maintain a rigorous program of legal education that prepares its students, 
upon graduation, for admission to the bar . . . .”); Standard 316, Bar Passage (stating “At least 75 
percent of a law school’s graduates in a calendar year who sat for a bar examination must have 
passed a bar examination administered within two years of their date of graduation.”). 
41 Note that “resources under their control” is broader than a law school’s “internal resources.”  
Internal resources are usually owned by a law school.  However, a law school may control resources 
beyond what they actually own.  This was part of the reason for including the “Catalysts” in Stage 
3 of the process described in the earlier article.  Gaughan, supra note 1, at 295–96.  Not only do the 
Catalysts possess an external perspective, they also are more likely to control or otherwise be 
aware of external resources that might be available to the individual law school.  Id.  Often, these 
types of resources are available by virtue of an engaged alumni association or similar network 
connected to the particular law school.  Id.  
42  McCormack et al., supra note 34, at F537. 
43  Nicholas Bloom et al., Does Management Matter in Schools? (NBER Working Paper Series, No. 
20667, Nov. 2014); see also Seng Kiat Kok & Claire McDonald, Underpinning Excellence in Higher 
Education: An Investigation into the Leadership, Governance and Management Behaviours of High-
Performing Academic Departments, 42.2 Stud. In Higher Educ. 210 (2017). 
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means of overcoming institutionalization at the organizational level and achieving 
a sustainable competitive advantage.44  Of course, all of this starts with the rather 
fundamental question of what, exactly, are the resources of an individual firm—or 
law school? 
2. Three Types of Firm Resources 
At its most fundamental level, “firm resources include all assets, capabilities, 
organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled 
by the firm that enables the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that 
improve its efficiency and effectiveness.”45  However, all resources are not of equal 
value.  For resources to create a lasting advantage, the resources must be 
“imperfectly imitable,” and “organizationally appropriate.” 46   Further, only 
resources that are “valuable” and “rare” to a relevant group of existing or potential 
customers create unique economic value for the organization. 47   In essence, 
“valuable” resources are those that are especially “meaningful” goods or services.  
“Rare” resources are those that are uniquely “distinctive.” 
Fortunately, organizational resources that are not currently “valuable” or “rare” 
can sometimes be redeployed or combined with other resources in innovative ways 
that become more “meaningful” and “distinctive.”48  This is where the critical role of 
resource management comes in.49   Ordinarily, without conscious management, 
resources will continue to be used as they have been in the past or otherwise drift.50  
If the firm has no [focus on] strategy, . . .  the types of competencies available from 
[resources] is likely to be largely opportunity driven.  The result is more often than not 
that the strengths built in terms of relationships and competencies are ad hoc and not 
further leveraged . . .  [in the future].51 
 
44  See Gaughan, supra note 1, for further discussion of these issues. 
45  Jay B. Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. of Mgmt. 99, 101 (1991). 
46  Gaughan, supra note 1, at 268–73. 
47  Robert S. Nason & Johan Wiklund, An Assessment of Resource-Based Theorizing on Firm Growth 
and Suggestions for the Future, 44 J. of Mgmt. 32, 35 (2018). 
48  Gaughan, supra note 1, at 261–76. 
49  Deans are “expected to deploy or redeploy faculty in ways that meet the needs of the 
institution as well as the specialized interest of individual professors.”  Wallace D. Loh, The 
Longevity of Deans: Leadership, Community, and Governance, AALS Newsletter (Assoc. of Am. Law 
Sch., Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1996, at 3. 
50  Bente R. Lowendahl, Strategic Management of Professional Service Firms 75 (2d 
ed. 2000). 
51  Id. at 73. 
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Without focus on any strategic priorities, resources may be unnecessarily 
depleted meeting the operational needs of the law school—without regard to the 
creation of anything distinctive and meaningful to existing or potential students.  
Undoubtedly, some operational activities are necessary and may incidentally create 
some value.  However, without sustained focus and support for aspects that are 
distinctive and meaningful to potential students, the perceived value of the 
education provided by the particular law school will likely diminish. 
To be clear, every law school needs to support some resources that may not be 
overtly distinctive.  Quite often, resources must be exerted in order to comply with 
the qualifying requirements of some authorities (such as complying with the 
requirements of the university to which the law school belongs or the ABA).  
However, according to the Resource Based View, the key to unique law school 
success is in assuring that all remaining resources are consciously managed to 
achieve both a meaningful and distinctive market position. If all remaining 
resources are instead expended on indistinguishable qualifying requirements, like 
the generic provision of bar preparation,52 then the law school has essentially assured 
that its education will not be viewed by potential students as being particularly 
unique or valuable. 
By recognizing that some resources are more valuable than others, the Resource 
Based View recognizes that there are some areas where prioritized investment and 
focus can provide a unique advantage for the particular law school.53  Even though 
law is a “public good,”  differentiation is both appropriate and necessary as to the 
 
52  It should be noted that bar preparation, by itself, is not inherently undistinctive.  If the law 
school creates its own distinctive approach to bar passage, and it works, then the Resource Based 
View would recognize the investment as distinctive.  For example, consider the distinctive bar 
passage reputation achieved by Florida International University, College of Law.  See, e.g., Andrew 
Pantazi, Which Flordia Law Schools have the Highest Bar Passage Rate? New Florida Bar Results Posted, 
Fla. Times Union (Sept. 16, 2019, 2:51 PM), https://www.jacksonville.com/news/20190916/which-
florida-law-schools-have-highest-bar-passage-rate-new-florida-bar-results-posted 
[https://perma.cc/G7JW-W36H] (last visited Feb. 8, 2020); Mike Stetz, An Unexpected Leader, Nat’l 
Jurist, Winter 2020, at 11, https://bluetoad.com/publication/frame.php?i=641735&p=11&pn=&ver
=html5 [https://perma.cc/8R72-XGUR] (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).  See generally Jeffrey S. Kinsler 
& Jeffrey Omar Usman, Law Schools, Bar Passage, and Under and Over Performing Expectations, 36 
Quinnipiac L. Rev. 183 (2018). 
53  Campbell, supra note 2, at 359 (citing Michael Porter, What is Strategy?, Harv. Bus. Rev. 61, 64 
(1996) “Strategy requires making choices and making choices that make an institution different 
in some important and sustainable way from its competitors.  ‘Competitive strategy is about being 
different.  It means deliberately choosing a different set of activities to deliver a unique mix of 
value.’”). 
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type and value of the legal education delivered.54  At the other extreme, there are 
firm resources that are admittedly “unavoidable waste.”55  The challenge for any 
organization is to optimally support high value resources while triaging or 
redeploying lesser value resources.  In the short term, this support can possibly be 
achieved by lightening a teaching or service load for a professor who is considered 
“a high value resource” because they are heavily involved in implementing the 
current strategic plan or other high priority activity.  Such a lightening of teaching 
or service load would require the redeployment of another professor to fill the 
teaching or service gap created.  Ideally, the redeployment would utilize a professor 
otherwise engaged in low value activities (in reference to the organization’s 
strategic priorities).  Ultimately, however, the challenge for every law school is to 
acquire, develop and support high value resources while disposing or minimizing 
the cost of resources that continually constitute waste. 
In a worst-case scenario, an individual law school will completely succumb to 
the isomorphic pressures of institutionalization and mindlessly mimic other law 
schools.  This school will use most of its limited resources to meet operational 
demands and address the minimum requirements for ABA accreditation.  If there 
are any remaining resources, they will likely be allocated in an ad hoc manner.  Some 
distinctive and meaningful resources may coincidentally receive minor support—
to the same degree as the perpetually less productive resources.  However, law 
schools of this type will achieve little in the way of creating any competitive 
advantage.  Not perceiving any unique value, potential students will decide to 
attend another school, or select the particular law school based upon purely 
financial and/or convenience considerations.56  
 
54  Although legal knowledge is a “public good,” the premise of this paper is that the provision of 
legal education extends more broadly.  Even though legal knowledge is non-excludable and non-
rivalrous, the same cannot be said regarding the means of structuring, communicating, and 
applying the knowledge.  It is in these later attributes that the Resource Based View focuses on 
the distinctiveness and meaning of organizational resource deployment in order to deliver unique 
value. 
55  Penrose, supra note 36, at 60. 
56  Theoretically, one of the easiest ways to get a feel for the distinctiveness and meaning of a 
particular law school’s brand would be to consider the extent to which cost plays a role in student 
decisions to attend the particular school.  Less distinctive law schools will need to price 
aggressively to recruit students—either through lower tuition, larger scholarships or financial 
aid.  In contrast, law schools with stronger brands would largely use scholarships and financial 
aid to assure class diversity rather than to assure minimum class sizes.  Curiously, an accurate 
measure of price sensitivity might be a better measure of reputation or brand value than any 
survey of law school applicants.  Cf. 2012 Law School Applicant Survey, Law Sch. Admis. Council 
(2013) (on file with authors). 
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In sharp contrast, according to the Resource Based View, innovative law schools 
will actively examine their existing resources and intentionally optimize the value 
of their configurations and uses.  Innovative law schools will realize when some 
resources are really just “waste”—and manage accordingly through a carefully 
prioritized distribution of support.  Of course, innovative law schools will 
appreciate both the actual and potential uses of all resources in achieving strategic 
goals.  Sometimes it is not the resource, but the manner of its current deployment, 
that is the problem.  Other times, adaptation of the resource may be necessary.  But 
for innovative law schools, any given resource will be managed consistent with its 
highest value (either directly, indirectly or in combination with other resources) in 
reference to a distinct population of tuition paying students.  Of course, innovative 
law schools will achieve these goals through the engaged cooperative input and 
participation of both the faculty and Dean. 
Looking further, in considering how different types of resources might be 
configured during the implementation process to create a sustainable competitive 
advantage, law schools should be aware that there are three main categories of 
resources: physical capital resources, organizational capital resources and human 
capital resources.57  Each of these are discussed immediately below. 
a. Physical Capital Resources 
The first type of resource, “physical capital resources,” includes the “physical 
technology used in the firm, a firm’s plant and equipment, its geographic location, 
and its access to raw materials.58  In this way, an individual law school may establish 
a competitive advantage (for some duration) by investing in an impressive, unique 
building or upgrade. 59   Similarly, an individual law school could combine 
investment or access to state-of-the-art technology with related curricular 
programming. 60   However, these types of resources usually require continued 
investment in order to remain a source of sustainable competitive advantage.  The 
continued investment keeps these types of resources from either becoming obsolete 
or otherwise enables them to maintain their distinctiveness relative to other law 
schools.  Although these types of resources are meaningful, they cease to be 
 
57  Barney, supra note 45, at 101. 
58  Id. 
59  Ann W. Parks, Editor, Superblock! The Vision for Georgetown Law, Georgetown Law 30, 31 
(Fall/Winter 2019). 
60  See, e.g., Law, Science, and Technology, Harv. L. Sch., https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/academics/
programs-of-study/law-science-and-technology/ [https://perma.cc/T9AH-JGRW] (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2020). 
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distinctive once they are copied by other law schools or once they start to wear out. 
In a far less depreciable way, some law schools also may be able to take 
advantage of their unique geographic location as a form of a physical capital 
resource.  For better or worse, this can take the form of their proximity to unique 
attractions—like being near Washington, D.C., a state capital, or local county seat.61  
Geographic location can also provide easier access to qualified adjunct law faculty, 
student jobs62 and internships.  And, it can take the form of a convenient proximity 
to a local population of students interested in attending law school.63  Generally 
speaking, physical capital resources either require a long-term investment to 
maintain distinctiveness, or are largely fixed by the location(s) of the given law 
school. 
b. Organizational Capital Resources 
The second type of resource, “organizational capital” “involve[s] the firm's 
reporting structure, planning processes, control and coordination systems, and 
information relations among workers within the firm, between firms, and within 
the business environment.”64  Another definition of organizational capital is: 
[T]he combination of explicit and implicit, formal and informal knowledge which in an 
effective and efficient way structure and develop the organizational activity of the firm, 
that includes culture—implicit and informal knowledge; structure—explicit and formal 
knowledge; and organizational learning—implicit and explicitly, formal and informal 
renewal knowledge processes . . . .65 
Given existing ABA regulations, organizational capital is inextricably linked to 
 
61  See Barton, supra note 15, at 182 (explaining that the location of Washington & Lee Law 
School “is lovely, but it presents a challenge for an aspirational top-twenty law school . . . it is 
pretty, but in terms of drawing faculty is a little too isolated . . . .”). 
62  See id. at 194 (discussing innovation challenges at the University of Cincinnati and several 
Ohio law schools and the unfavorable Ohio job prospects for their graduates.).  
63  Cf. id. at 182 (discussing how Washington & Lee Law School “finds itself in a crowded 
Virginia/D.C. marketplace for law schools.”). 
64  Rajshekhar (Raj) G. Javalgi & Patricia R. Todd, Entrepreneurial Orientation, Management 
Commitment, and Human Capital: The Internationalization of SMEs in India, 64 J. Bus. Res. 1004, 1005 
(Sept. 2011). 
65  Gregorio Martin-de-Castro et al., Organizational Capital as Competitive Advantage of The Firm, 7 
J. Intell. Cap. 328 (2005).  This article subdivided intellectual capital assets between human 
capital, technological capital, organizational capital, business capital and social capital.  Id.  
However, for present purposes, the division of physical capital assets, knowledge capital assets 
and organizational capital will suffice. 
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law school shared governance and internal decision making. 66   Its continued 
linkage is assumed by the current article.  Nonetheless, existing law school 
organizational capital is likely to have been negatively impacted by the 
institutionalization of U.S. legal education.  To a large extent, one purpose of the 
current article is to work around these challenges to provide a means (within 
existing shared governance structures) to implement a strategic plan.  The 
successful implementation of any strategic plan (including during Stage 6 of the 
Process Model) relies upon the proper deployment and potential modification of a 
law school’s resources—including its organizational capital.  
c. Human Capital Resources 
The third type of resource, “human capital” includes the “training, experience, 
judgment, intelligence, relationships, and insight of individual managers and 
workers in a firm.”67  As might be expected, “human capital” includes much of the 
core resources relied upon by law schools to create value for their students.  To a 
large extent, human capital resources begin with a foundation based upon the 
education and experience of the faculty.68 
[T]he human capital pool refers to the stock of employee skills that exist within a firm at 
any given point in time.  Theorists focus on the need to develop a pool of human capital 
that has either higher levels of skills (general and/or firm specific), or achieving a better 
alignment between the skills represented in the firm and those required by its strategic 
intent.69 
Traditionally, U.S. law schools have focused more on the former “need to 
develop a pool of human capital that has . . . higher levels of skills.”70  However, it is 
the position of the current article that, in order to successfully implement a strategic 
plan, law schools need to spend far more time on the latter task of “achieving a better 
alignment between the skills represented [and deployed] in the firm and those 
required by its strategic intent.”71  Achieving this alignment would address some of 
 
66  Organization and Administration, Standard 201, Law School Governance, 2019-2020 A.B.A. 
Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law SchOOLS ch. 2 (a) (“The dean and 
the faculty shall have the primary responsibility and authority for planning, implementing, and 
administering the program of legal education of the law school, including curriculum, methods 
of instruction and evaluation, admissions policies and procedures, and academic standards.”). 
67  Barney, supra note 45, at 101 (emphasis omitted). 
68  See, e.g., Theodore W. Schultz, Capital Formation by Education, 68.6 J. Pol. Econ. 571 (1960). 
69  Patrick M. Wright et al., Human Resources and The Resource Based View of The Firm, 27 J. of 
Mgmt. 701, 704 (2001). 
70  Id. 
71  Id.  See infra p. 14 for a discussion on vertical fit. 
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the most destructive aspects of institutionalization.  Given the importance of this 
issue to implementation success, the following section explains the connection 
between the Resource Based View and Strategic Human Resource Management 
(“SHRM”).72 
3. RBV and Strategic Human Resource Management 
As noted by two of the founding scholars in the field of Strategic Human 
Resource Management, “[SHRM, is a] . . . pattern of planned human resource 
deployments and activities intended to enable an organization to achieve its 
[strategic] goals.” 73   “The basic premise underlying SHRM is that organizations 
adopting a particular strategy require HR practices that are different than those 
required by organizations adopting alternative strategies.”74  This is particularly 
true where, as here, an organization relies heavily upon human resources in 
attempting to overcome institutionalization and to implement a distinctive and 
meaningful strategy. 
In looking at the challenge this way, it could be said that there are actually two 
dimensions to human resource management.  On one hand, there is a pressing need 
for the configuration and deployment of human resources to align with the 
externally-looking strategic priorities of the organization.  On the other hand, there 
is a pressing need for the alignment of internal rules and policies governing internal 
human resource management to optimize the potential productivity of “employees” 
in ways that are beneficial to the organization.  These dimensions are directly 
reflected in the structure of SHRM.  
First, “vertically, [SHRM] entails the linking of human resource management 
practices with the [externally focused] strategic management process of the 
 
72  Here, and throughout this article, the term SHRM is used to abbreviate “Strategic Human 
Resource Management” and is not to be confused with the Society of Human Resource 
Management at www.shrm.org.  
73  Patrick M. Wright & Gary C. McMahan, Theoretical Perspectives for Strategic Human Resource 
Management, 18 J. of Mgmt. 295, 298 (1992).  See also Li-Qun Wei, Strategic Human Resource 
Management: Determinants of Fit, 14 Res. and Prac. in Hum. Res. Mgmt. No. 2, at 49 (2006) 
(“Although there is still no consensus on an exact definition of SHRM among scholars, broad 
agreement has been reached on its basic function, which involves designing and implementing a 
set of internally consistent policies and practices that ensure the human capital of a firm 
contributes to the achievement of its business objectives.”). 
74  John E. Delery & D. Harold Doty, Modes of Theorizing in Strategic Human Resource Management: 
Tests of Universalistic, Contingency, and Configurational Performance Predictions, 39 Acad. of Mgmt. J. 
802, 802 (1992). 
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organization.” 75   Second, “horizontally, [SHRM] entails the coordination or 
congruence among the various [internal organizational] human resource 
management practices . . . through a pattern of planned action.” 76   In essence, 
SHRM is a tool through which U.S. law schools can operationally apply the Resource 
Based View both “vertically” and “horizontally” to human capital deployment in 
connection with any strategic plan implementation.  This will improve both 
resource management in general and increase the likelihood of implementation 
success (i.e. in Stage 6 of the Process model).77 
a. The Concept of Vertical Fit 
The concept of “vertical fit” rests on the “perspective that the effectiveness of an 
HR system depends on the extent to which it supports the employee contributions 
required to achieve an organization’s strategic goals.”78  In effect, vertical fit focuses 
on how the alignment of individual faculty capabilities enable a law school to 
distinctively compete. 79   This has obvious implications for overcoming 
institutionalization and the success of any implementation effort. 
At its simplest level, vertical fit relates to how an individual law school facilitates 
the possession of faculty with the skills and interests sufficient to achieve the 
organization’s strategic goals.  For instance, vertical fit implicates the desirability of 
faculty members possessing particular specialties in order to both fulfill the 
minimum requirements of the school (scholarship, teaching, etc.) as well as enable 
the school to achieve its distinctive, strategic goals.  Ordinarily, faculty members 
 
75  Wright & McMahan., supra note 73, at 298. 
76  Id.  
77  See Natalia Garcia-Carbonell et al., Is Double Fit a Sufficient Condition for SHRM Success? The 
Missing Link Between Intended and Implemented HRM Strategy, 23 Int’l J. of Org. Analysis 264, 265 
(2015).  “By achieving both [vertical and horizontal fit], HR strategies should influence 
organizational performance positively.”  (citing Lloyd Baird & Ilan Meshoulam, Managing Two Fits 
of Strategic Human Resource Management, 13 Acad. of Mgmt. Rev. No. 1, at 116–28 (1988); Karen A. 
Golden & Vasudevan Ramanujam, Between a Dream and a Nightmare: On The Integration of The 
Ruman Resource Management and Strategic Business Planning Process, 24 Hum. Res. Mgmt. No. 4, at 
429–52 (1985); Mick Marchington et al., Alignment, Integration and Consistency in HRM Across Multi-
Employer Networks, 53 Hum. Res. Mgmt. No. 3, at 313–39 (2011); Patrick Wright & Scott A.Snell , 
Toward An Integrative View of Strategic Human Resource Management, 1 Hum. Res. Mgmt. Rev. No. 3, 
at 203–25 (1991)). 
78  Joo Hun Han et al., The Goldilocks Effect of Strategic Human Resource Management? Optimizing the 
Benefits of a High Performance Work System through the Dual Alignment of Vertical and Horizontal Fit, 62 
Acad. of Mgmt. J. 1388, 2 (2016). 
79  “[D]istinctiveness . . . is principally related to vertical fit.”  Garcia-Carbonell et al., supra note 
77, at 272. 
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can easily fulfill the minimum requirements.  But as can be seen in the Monte Carlo 
simulation (later in this article), faculty skills must still properly align and be 
deployed so that law schools can achieve their distinctive, strategic goals.  
One common example where vertical fit is often left to chance relates to the 
traditional use of “job talks” in law faculty hiring.  Assume, for instance, that there 
is a job posting indicating that a position requires “quality teaching” in one or more 
specific subjects.  After a preliminary review of curricula vitae and possibly a phone 
interview or maybe some viewing of youtube presentations, a handful of finalists 
are invited to campus.  Traditionally, each of the finalists is then asked to give a “job 
talk” related to their recent scholarship.  The faculty then vote on who to hire.  A 
critical omission is that there is no effort to directly evaluate the quality of the 
candidates’ teaching abilities.80  
The traditional use of the “job talk” is certainly appropriate for hiring someone 
primarily responsible for a law school’s strategic priorities related to scholarship.  
However, vertical fit is lacking if a “job talk” is used to evaluate candidates for a 
position primarily intended to support strategic priorities regarding quality 
teaching.  Even if there is some positive correlation between quality scholarship and 
quality teaching, 81   there is no legitimate reason to rely upon any indirect 
measures.82  
 
80  “[T]he candidate review process fails to allow for any in depth observations of the candidate's 
teaching abilities . . . .”  Daniel Gordon, Hiring Law Professors: Breaking the Back of an American 
Plutocratic Oligarchy, 19 Widener L. J. 137, 145 (2009). 
81  The current article takes no position regarding the sometimes contentious “view that 
teaching and research are harmonious and mutually beneficial activities.”  Simon Cadez et al., 
Research, Teaching and Performance Evaluation in Academia: The Salience of Quality, 42.8 Stud. in 
Higher Educ. 1455, 1455 (2017).  Suffice it to state that there are apparent inconsistencies in the 
literature.  See, e.g., John Hattie & Herbert W. Marsh, The Relationship Between Research and Teaching: 
A Meta-Analysis, 66 Rev. of Educ. Res. 507 (1996).  But see Craig S. Galbraith & Gregory B. Merrill, 
Faculty Research Productivity and Standardized Student Learning Outcomes in a University Teaching 
Environment: A Bayesian Analysis of Relationships, 37 Stud. in Higher Educ. 469 (2012). 
82  The use of direct assessments—by actually seeing a candidate teach—has the benefit of “face 
validity and credibility.”  Hunter M. Breland & Judith L. Gaynor, A Comparison of Direct and Indirect 
Assessments of Writing Skill, 16 J. of Educ. Measurement 119, 119 (1979).  This is particularly true 
where the correlation between scholarly quality and teaching quality has been found to be weak—
even if still statistically significant.  Under these circumstances, an indirect assessment is likely 
to be quite inferior to a direct assessment.  For example, consider the positive relationship 
between quality scholarship and teaching found in Cadez et al., supra note 81.  In Cadez, a one unit 
improvement in scholarship quality (measured as “the proportion of papers published in high-
quality journals relative to all papers published by a particular researcher”) resulted in an 
improvement in measured teaching quality of between just 0.002 to 0.003 (where teaching quality 
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Curiously, other disciplines routinely require teaching demonstrations during 
the interview process—even for faculty candidates with scholarly priorities.83  If 
quality teaching is a strategic priority for a specific law school, the failure to provide 
mechanisms to directly evaluate the teaching abilities of candidates indicates a clear 
defect in the hiring process.84  As a result of the omission, the determination of 
vertical fit is left to chance.  Over time, the quality of law school teaching will reflect 
the random nature of success and failure.  The quality of law faculty teaching will 
reflect no coherent strategy—even if the minimal hiring requirements are fulfilled.  
Unfortunately, the determination of an appropriate vertical fit is often more 
challenging than simply identifying an omitted teaching evaluation.  For instance, 
vertical fit is often implicated when considering the desirability of hiring faculty 
with varying intellectual interests across both scholarship and teaching.  This 
problem often begins with an innocuous job posting simply looking for someone 
with a passion to teach a particular subject.  For instance, consistent with the 
strategic plan, a law school may seek to hire someone focused on Environmental 
Law.  The posting may correctly stress that the desired person should have a passion 
for Environmental Law and will teach courses in that area. 
The problem sometimes arises during the interview process when an otherwise 
intelligent, promising, scholarly candidate indicates that they have never taught 
Environmental law but are “thrilled” to learn how.  The candidate then adds that 
their real scholarly passion is for something completely unrelated—like Criminal 
Law.  Invariably, some faculty will focus on the scholarly appeal of the candidate’s 
brilliant publications and job talk.  While singing the candidate’s praises, these 
faculty often implicitly or explicitly assert that anyone can learn how to teach 
Environmental law.  These faculty will also likely point out how much stronger the 
Criminal Law capabilities would be with this candidate to the faculty.  And yet, if 
any attempt is made to require the candidate to produce scholarship in 
 
was measured on a scale of 1 to 5).  See Cadez et al., supra note 81, at 1464 and 1468, Table 4 
respectively.  According to the positive results from Cadez, if a researcher were to increase the 
number of their “high-quality” journal publications by 10%, their average teaching evaluation 
would only improve between .02 and .03 (on a scale of 1 to 5).  For a discussion of problems 
inherent in both direct and indirect assessments, see Deborah Crusan, An Assessment of ESL 
Writing Placement Assessment, 8 Assessing Writing 17, 18–21 (2002) (noting that direct assessment 
is “authentic” but “unreliable due to inconsistencies in scoring by independent raters”—
something that exists equally in both direct and indirect assessments during any law school job 
interview). 
83  By implication, if a law school has a strategic priority as to both scholarship and teaching, all 
candidates should be required to both give a job talk and provide a teaching demonstration. 
84  See Gordon, supra note 80, at 145. 
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Environmental Law, multiple faculty members would likely object to the 
requirement as being an improper restriction of “academic freedom.”85 
If successful (and the particular candidate is hired), the organization’s 
immediate strategic goals will have been effectively ignored.  Even worse, the hiring 
decision will have a sustained impact on the resource configuration of the law 
school (potentially) for years to come.  Ultimately, it may be that the law school will 
benefit from having an additional Criminal Law scholar on the faculty.  However, 
without informed strategic consideration, it is at least as likely that the law school 
will fail to distinguish itself in any area of strategic importance.  If this is a long-
term pattern, the subject matter expertise of the law faculty will not reflect any 
coherent strategy—even if the teaching requirements are fulfilled. 
In sum, the failure to control for vertical fit in hiring decisions presents a 
significant challenge for any law school looking to implement a strategic plan.  
Long-term success requires a hiring process that does more than just randomly 
meet minimal requirements.  Consequently, a law school should anticipate, address 
and avoid likely vertical fit challenges as early as possible.  Otherwise, at best, 
vertical fit will be left to chance and the ability of the given organization to achieve 
its strategic goals will be undermined.  
b. The Concept of Horizontal Fit 
Horizontal fit focuses on the extent to which internal policies and practices 
“interrelate, reinforcing each other to achieve strategic synergies.”86  Such policies 
and practices “must be connected and complemented internally to work 
efficiently.”87  Ideally, horizontal fit appropriately relates, rationalizes, aligns and 
streamlines rules governing the operation of a given law school.  Where vertical fit 
is concerned with effectiveness, horizontal fit is concerned with efficiency.  Ideally, 
horizontal fit makes it easier for faculty to do the right things while making it more 
difficult to do things that fail to add organizational value.  If horizontal fit is not 
achieved, an implementation effort is likely to be undermined by bureaucratic 
 
85  See generally Philip G. Altbach, Academic freedom: International Realities and Challenges, 41 
Higher Educ. 205, 206–07 (2001). 
86  Garcia-Carbonell et.al., supra note 77, at 269 (citing Clint Chadwick, Theoretic Insights on The 
Nature of Performance Synergies in Human Resource Systems: Toward Greater Precision, Hum. Res. 
Mgmt. Rev. 85 (2010); Yongmei Liu et al., The Value of Human Resource Management for 
Organizational Performance, 50 Bus. Horizons 503 (2007); Al-Karim Samnani & Parbudyal Singh, 
Exploring the Fit Perspective: An Ethnographic Approach, 52 Hum. Res. Mgmt. 123 (2013)). 
87  Id.  See also Fernando Martín-Alcázar et al., Strategic Human Resource Management: Integrating 
The Universalistic, Contingent, Configurational and Contextual Perspectives, 16 The Int’l J. of Hum. 
Res. Mgmt. 633–59 (2005). 
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intransigence and misaligned faculty obligations.  
For instance, the authors recently heard about a great example of a university-
based rule that clearly lacked horizontal fit.  In an effort to improve expense 
management, a particular university dramatically increased the requirements of 
credit card expense reports.  The new rules included the typical receipts, basic form, 
and supervisory sign-off.  However, the university added additional requirements 
regarding detailed narrative descriptions and the proper selection of billing account 
numbers.  Undoubtedly, the new system was an accountant’s dream.  
In order to encourage faculty to submit their expense materials on time, the 
university also started to disable university issued credit cards if the required 
materials were not submitted promptly.  Exceptions were not freely given.  The 
university even went so far as to threaten to deny any reimbursement requests that 
did not use the university credit card.  
Undoubtedly, the new rules were well-intended.  The proper use and reporting 
of university credit cards is certainly important.  However, the new rules were so 
burdensome that some faculty members simply avoided doing any work that 
required the use of the university credit cards.  University trips were cancelled—
even ones clearly for the benefit of the university.  Regular purchases were 
redirected through purchasing.  Invitations for university-related dinners were 
declined.  The lack of horizontal fit essentially deterred many faculty members from 
voluntarily doing anything beyond the absolute minimum for their job.  
Undoubtedly, expenses were reduced, but at what cost?  Faculty disengaged.  The 
valid pursuit of university interests was strangled.  Horizontal fit was missing. 
Horizontal fit also presents a challenge for some law schools regarding the 
manner in which faculty performance is evaluated.  Rather than have detailed job 
descriptions and evaluation criteria, law faculty are generally evaluated across three 
general categories: scholarship, teaching and service.  The problem for horizonal fit 
is not so much in the categories themselves, as in the failure to clearly communicate 
the standards within these categories that would optimally support the individual 
law school’s goals.  In an effort to be flexible, the formal standards only 
communicate the minimally acceptable behavior.  In turn, the ambiguous criteria 
fail to encourage faculty members to align their behavior with the law school’s 
strategic priorities.  Instead, the rules encourage “satisficing” faculty behavior as to 
the law school’s interests.  Once the minimal requirements are met, each faculty 
member is free to pursue individual interests (without regard to furthering any 
strategic priorities of the law school).  
“Satisficing” is a term coined by Nobel Prize Winning Economist Herbert A. 
Simon to describe decision making where the search for a “right” answer stops as 
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soon as a minimally acceptable solution is found. 88   For many law faculty, the 
personal choice is to either attempt to determine optimal performances supporting 
the law school (in the absence of any express guidance), or to simply meet the 
minimal requirements for continued employment.89  Under these circumstances, 
some faculty members will rationally focus on meeting only the minimum 
requirements.  
Just as before, the failure to control for horizontal fit does not necessarily imply 
that law faculty will consciously work against the best interests of the law school.  
That is unlikely.  However, if the presence of horizontal fit is left to chance, only 
some faculty members will successfully align their behavior with the law school’s 
strategic goals.  Others will not.  Over time, this omission is likely to present yet 
another challenge to successful plan implementation.  
Given the likely issues concerning both vertical and horizontal fit within many 
law schools, it is submitted that additional mechanisms are necessary to better align 
law faculty with any implementation effort.  This is especially true given recent 
research that indicates successful implementation needs more than just consistent 
vertical and horizontal fit.  The research suggests that the implementation effort “be 
positively perceived and accepted by employees, so that their attitudes and 
behaviors [can] be oriented towards strategic objectives.”90  What is necessary is to 
cooperatively address any existing defects while also focusing on achieving a 
successful implementation.  It is submitted that the best approach is simply to 
maintain meaningful faculty engagement and law school leadership. 
 
88  Denise E. Agosto, Bounded Rationality and Satisficing in Young People’s Web-Based Decision 
Making, 53.1 J. of the Am. Soc’y for Info. Sci. and Tech. 16, 17 (2002).  See also Herbert A. Simon, 
Administrative Behavior 118–20 (1947). 
89  William F. Massy, an expert in economic and leadership issues confronting colleges and 
universities, utilizes the term “satisficing” in the higher educational context.  
“Satisficing . . . means that, although faculty want to do a good job for their students and usually 
will expend enough time and effort to achieve what they believe to be satisfactory performance, 
they are quick to turn their attention to research once they have attained the quality 
threshold . . . . The mantra of the quality movement, which also applies to productivity is ‘Good 
enough isn’t.’ The implication of satisficing is ‘Good enough is’ which stops continuous 
improvement in its tracks.”  William F. Massy, Creative Paths to Boosting Academic Productivity, in 
Reinventing Higher Education: The Promise of Innovation 73, 78 (Ben Wildavsky et al. eds. 
2011). 
90  Garcia-Carbonell et al., supra note 77, at 276. 
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4. The Critical Role of Engagement and Leadership During 
Implementation 
Considering some of the implementation challenges likely to face many U.S. 
law schools, one remedial option could be to simply endorse abandoning the shared 
governance structure of U.S. law schools. 91   However, such drastic structural 
changes are probably not necessary for the vast majority of U.S. law schools.  Recall 
that the earlier article addressed “faculty engagement and leadership concerns by 
intentionally utilizing a faculty-led process with input from the Dean.” 92   For 
implementation success, this cooperative integrated approach is now even more 
imperative. 
Existing research suggests that meaningful communication can be particularly 
effective in fostering voluntary support for implementing improvements to any 
human resource system: 
Implicit . . . is the importance of organizational communication in the transition from 
HRM strategy formulation [designed to improve vertical and/or horizontal fit] to 
implementation.  Communication processes are particularly relevant to create and 
manage . . . meanings [regarding vertical and horizontal fit] that will be translated to 
employees, affecting their perceptions of the . . . system . . . [E]fficient communication 
can help organizations to obtain desired employee behaviours, and clarify what is 
expected from them to carry out the business strategy.93 
Moreover, the benefits of clear communication extend beyond just managing 
perceptions: 
[O]rganizational communication is not only important to guide employees’ perceptions 
but it also helps line managers to implement practices, by providing consensual and 
coherent HRM messages.  In these situations, it will be easier to build shared 
understanding about the HRM system, avoiding gaps between intended HR strategies 
and implemented practices.94  
This advice would appear to apply with even greater force where the “employees” 
and “line managers” are combined with executive management in the context of 
U.S. law school shared governance.  “[I]nformal persuasion and collaboration”95 is 
 
91  See, e.g., Brenton E. Newton, The Ninety-Five Theses: Systemic Reforms of American Legal Education 
and Licensure, 64 S.C. L. Rev. 55, 72 (2012). 
92  Supra intro. pt. B, The Seven-Stage Process and The Implementation Challenge.  See also Gaughan, 
supra note 1, at 261–66. 
93  Garcia-Carbonell et al., supra note 77, at 275. 
94  Id. (citations omitted). 
95  Nancy B. Rapoport, “Venn” and the Art of Shared Governance, 35 U. Tol. L. Rev 169, 176 (2003); 
see also Rapoport, supra note 28, at 371; see also Hrebiniak, supra note 29, at 18 (“Leading effective 
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necessary to achieve a consensus and focus on supporting the implementation 
effort. 
As part of this cooperative effort, the Dean’s role is primarily providing clear 
leadership and communicating clear goals. 96   Additionally, the more subtle 
leadership provided by the widely-respected faculty members97 provides a critical 
peer-based mechanism for clarifying meaning and encouraging a more aligned 
effort by all faculty members.  The continued participation of the widely-respected 
faculty members98 should be used to continuously provide for faculty involvement 
and input into resource allocation decisions.  Otherwise, efforts to improve 
resource management could inadvertently lead to faculty burnout99 or revolt.100  
Beyond providing for cooperative leadership, recent research also suggests that 
positive incentives can be effective in motivating positive behavior by academic 
faculty.  Care should be taken to avoid any appearance of punitive intention in the 
resource allocation process.  Instead resource allocation decisions should perhaps 
include policies, processes and incentives that: 1) Reward high performers; 2) Deal 
with poor performers; 3) Base Promotion on Performance; 4) Emphasize talent 
management; 5) Support Retaining talent; and 6) Attract talent through a “clear 
employee value proposition.”101  Of course, the meaning of the specific terms can be 
adjusted to comport with the general consensus of the faculty.  This should be 
facilitated through the support of both the Dean and the widely-respected faculty 
 
change, the number one requisite for successful strategy implementation, also presupposes an 
ability to influence and move others into purposeful action.”). 
96  Ann Gilley et al., Characteristics of Leadership Effectiveness: Implementing Change and Driving 
Innovation in Organizations, 19 Hum. Res. Dev. Q. 153, 164–65 (2008) (Human resources scholars, 
Ann Gilley, Pamela Dixon and Jerry Gilley, have researched the most important characteristics of 
leadership effectiveness in implementing change and driving innovation in organizations.  These 
scholars name six characteristics in total and their two-year research indicates that these four are 
the most critical to successful implementation: ability to communicate, ability to motivate, ability 
to involve and support others, and ability to coach.  Communication and the ability to motivate 
were found to be the most critical.). 
97  As used throughout, the reference to “widely-respected faculty members” refers to the 
Convener group established in Stage 1 & 2 of the Process Model discussed in the earlier article. 
98  Supra intro. pt. B, The Seven-Stage Process and The Implementation Challenge. 
99  Robin Bauwens et al., Performance Management Fairness and Burnout: Implications for 
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors, 44.3 Stud. in Higher Educ. 584, 585 (2019). 
100  Cf. Barton, supra note 15 at 188–96 (discussing the response by law faculty at the University 
of Cincinnati to extremely unpopular austerity measures implemented by their dean). 
101  The list of six incentive areas was extracted from McCormack et al., supra note 34, at F541. 
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members.102 
For instance, leadership and collaboration can be used to define the appropriate 
limits on “dealing with poor performers.”  Similarly, the Dean and the widely-
respected faculty members 103  can cooperatively work to clarify exactly what 
constitutes “good performance,” “poor performance,” and a “clear employee value 
proposition.”  Within the context of optimal resource management, it is submitted 
that all of these determinations can be cooperatively formulated in terms that are 
fair, clear to the faculty and relate directly to implementing the school’s strategic 
plan.  The effort is unlikely to be easy or simple.  However, implementation success 
is still achievable. 
In fact, in looking at the four most common implementation problems below, 
many of the underlying problems can be attributed to the failure to clarify, 
communicate and execute with an aligned faculty.  Many of these basic problems 
can be solved through the cooperative engagement with faculty by both the Dean 
and the widely-respected faculty members.104 
B. Four Key Questions Related to Achieving an Optimal Implementation 
Although the following four questions could be asked and answered in any 
order, the presentation of the questions in this article is prioritized in the order that 
they are likely to be relevant to any implementation effort (i.e. Stage 6 of the Process 
Model).  Practically speaking, defects in the answers to the earliest questions will 
have the most immediate, obvious and significant detriment.  However, all are 
important to achieve the optimal benefits of a distinctive and meaningful strategic 
plan. 
1. Does Your School Have a Clearly Understood and Supported 
Strategy? 
Theoretically, the answer to the first question should not be any problem for a 
law school that has just completed Stage 5 (Update General Faculty on Strategy) and 
is ready to begin Stage 6 (Implement & Monitor) in the Process Model. 105   The 
answer should be an easy “yes.”  However, given the importance of vertical and 
horizontal fit (discussed previously), it may be wise to re-confirm the faculty 
understanding and support for the proposed strategy prior to actually attempting 
 
102  Supra note 97. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  Supra intro. pt. B, The Seven-Stage Process and The Implementation Challenge and accompanying 
model. 
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the implementation.106  Just because a majority of the faculty previously voted in 
favor of a strategic plan does not necessarily mean that the faculty remembers, 
understands and currently supports the strategy. 
Aside from confirming the continued faculty recollection and support, it is 
equally important at this point that the proposed strategy be perceived by faculty as 
being fully supported by law school leadership.107  This is specifically why the Dean 
is primarily responsible for leading the implementation process in Stage 6.108  In 
attempting to implement any change process within an institutionalized industry, 
it is critical to remember that actions “speak louder than words.” 109   Where an 
organization—such as a typical U.S. law school—has a history of minimally 
adaptive behavior, the baseline expectations of many law faculty may be that the 
current efforts are doomed to fail.  Communicating active support by leadership 
throughout the implementation process will tend to negate this.110 
Of course, the resistance to change may extend beyond faculty apathy. 111  
Making the implementation even more challenging may be the behavior of 
individual faculty members who are actively opposed to the proposed strategic 
changes. 112   Having failed to convince their colleagues that strategic priorities 
 
106  Robert H. Jerry, II, A Primer for the First-Time Law Dean Candidate, 49 J. Legal Educ. 564, 569 
(1999) (“[I]nstitutions prosper when the faculty and the Dean work together to achieve shared 
goals under a shared plan.”). 
107  Victor L. Streib, ed., AALS Law Deanship Manual: Report of the AALS Special 
Committee on the State of the Law School Deanship at 14–15 (1993) (“With regard to the 
faculty, probably the most important leadership role for the dean is to stimulate and implement 
the collective vision of the law school community.”).   
108  See Gaughan, supra note 1, at 283, 301 (explaining the role of the Dean and discussing Stage 6 
implementation). 
109  John Duffy & Nick Feltovich, Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison 
of Observation and Cheap Talk, 39 Games and Econ. Behav. 1, 1 (2002). 
110  Gilley et al., supra note 96.  
111  It has been acknowledged that “Professors have a reputation . . . when it comes to change—
skeptical, recalcitrant, resentful, even obstructionist, the Party of No.”  Further, “Faculty members 
have also learned that a plan for big changes typically means, ‘all of a sudden, I’m on a bunch of 
committees, and it’s just added to my workload without any extra compensation for me,’ says 
[James] Lang, of Assumption [College].”  Lee Gardner, The Barriers to Innovation, in The 
Innovation Imperative, 22–23 (2019).  
112  Campbell, supra note 2, at 362 (When law schools have past successes from which they 
developed processes, resources and values that helped them achieve those successes, it is harder 
for faculty to be on board with new, innovative change.  “Disruptive innovation theory shows that 
established processes . . . work almost like an immune system in rejecting radically new 
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should be modified or abandoned, dissident faculty members may attempt to enlist 
an “override” by the Dean.  If the Dean does not appreciate the threat posed by this 
back-channel dissent, the Dean may choose to avoid conflict by disengaging from 
the implementation effort altogether.  This presents a danger to the 
implementation effort in the form of “absentee leadership.”113  
Within the context of law schools, absentee leadership (either by the Dean or 
the widely-respected faculty members 114 ) tends to undermine the consensus 
supporting both the coordination and commitment of the general faculty. 115  
Without clear leadership, some law faculty members may become unsure of what to 
do to help. 116   Other faculty members—even ones otherwise supportive of the 
implementation effort—will be more likely to disengage from making coordinated 
contributions. 117   After all, if the law school leadership does not consider the 
successful implementation to be important, why should the faculty? As explained by 
a recent Harvard Business Review article (generally referencing an unidentified law 
school dean), absentee leadership “kills engagement and productivity.” 118   It 
undermines the successful implementation of any plan.   
In fact, absentee leadership does not even need to occur intentionally.  The 
negative impact is the same regardless of intentions.  Undoubtedly, Deans and 
faculty members experience distractions on a daily basis.  However, as long as the 
 
approaches (and that the incumbents almost always pass from the scene, unable to adapt to the 
new situation).”). 
113  Scott Gregory, The Most Common Type of Incompetent Leader, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://hbr.org/2018/03/the-most-common-type-of-incompetent-leader [https://perma.cc/BYR8-
HNGE] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (“Absentee leaders are people in leadership roles who are 
psychologically absent from them.  They . . . avoid meaningful involvement with their teams.  
Absentee leadership resembles the concept of rent-seeking in economics—taking value out of an 
organization without putting value in.  As such, they represent a special case of laissez-faire 
leadership, but one that is distinguished by its destructiveness.”). 
114  Supra note 97. 
115  Roger Gill, Change Management – or Change Leadership?, 3 J. of Change Mgmt. 307, 317 (2003) 
(“Change requires good management, but above all it requires effective leadership.”). 
116  Cf. id. at 312–14.  See also Hrebiniak, supra note 29, at 17 (“Without guidance, individuals do the 
things they think are important, often resulting in uncoordinated, divergent, even conflicting 
decisions and actions.  Without the benefit of a logical approach, execution suffers or fails because 
managers don’t know what steps to take and when to take them . . . Having a model or roadmap 
positively affects execution success; not having one leads to execution failure and frustration.”). 
117  Cf. Gill, supra note 115, at 307–17 (2003) (“Change requires good management, but above all it 
requires effective leadership.”). 
118  Gregory, supra note 113. 
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leadership is preoccupied with collateral matters, it will be more difficult for the 
individual law school to maintain the “strategic consensus” necessary to sustain an 
operational implementation.119  “Consensus is . . . critical in resolving differences, 
promoting a unified direction for the [law school], increasing strategic 
commitment, and enhancing the successful implementation of a given strategy.”120  
To maintain this consensus, and avoid the risks of absentee leadership, the law 
school leadership needs to make sure that the implementation remains a sustained 
top priority. 
In short, the optimal probability for successful implementation (in Stage 6) 
begins with a clearly understood strategy (from Stage 5) that is unambiguously 
supported by both talk and definitive action by law school leadership—especially 
the Dean.121  If the individual law school really does not have a clearly understood 
and supported strategy, it is critical that these defects be addressed before 
proceeding any further. 
2. Does Your School Have Objective Goals Linked to a Timetable? 
The next priority in attempting an implementation is to assure that objective 
goals have been agreed upon and that the goals are expressly linked to a calendar or 
timetable.  Given the previously discussed concerns related to faculty evaluation of 
performance and horizontal fit, it is critical that any law school implementation 
effort include specific and measurable goals.  First, measurement enables the 
objective comparison of the expected versus actual organizational performance.  
This provides a reality check as to whether or not the implementation and/or 
strategies are achieving their intended results.  Secondly, establishing specific and 
measurable goals facilitates individual accountability.122  “Measurement monitors 
continuous improvement, and individual, team and business unit performance.”123  
Of course, the operational steps that are necessary for a successful 
implementation may not neatly align with the traditional measures of law faculty 
performance.  Moreover, some faculty may not contribute to the law school in ways 
 
119  Molly Inhofe Rapert et al., The Strategic Implementation Process: Evoking Strategic Consensus 
Through Communication, 55 J. of Bus. Res. 301, 301 (2002). 
120  Id. at 302. 
121  Cf. Duffy & Feltovich, supra note 109, at 1. 
122  Joseph A. De Feo & Alexander Janssen, Implementing A Strategy Successfully, 5 Measuring Bus. 
Excellence 4–6 (2001). 
123  Id. at 5. 
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that directly link to the implementation effort.124  Nonetheless, unless special care 
is taken by law school leadership, it is all too easy for the evaluation of “scholarship, 
teaching and service” to be completely devoid of any accountability for the 
implementation process.  The measurement and evaluation of individual 
implementation support is therefore critically important.  Moreover, to the extent 
that the performance is objectively verifiable, measurement helps to maintain a 
focus on the important implementation benchmarks without inviting subjective 
evaluations.125 
Ideally, the question of objective goals and faculty evaluation should be 
expressly addressed up front at the very beginning of the implementation process.  
The law faculty should expressly agree on how and where implementation support 
will be measured for faculty evaluation purposes.  It may be that the faculty decide 
to add a fourth category of evaluation.  However, it may suffice to appropriately add 
subcategories to scholarship, teaching and service that expressly integrate critical 
dimensions of the implementation project.  In either case, it is highly likely that both 
the dean and widely-respected group of faculty members will need to establish a 
cooperative environment with the broader faculty in order to agree on the necessary 
measurements and control. 
Aside from the linkage of implementation to faculty evaluation, it is also 
important that certain objective benchmarks be established that are linked to a 
mutually agreed upon calendar or clearly defined timeline.  A defined timeline 
provides several benefits.  All participants can easily determine what is supposed to 
be accomplished, when, and by whom.  Additionally, a timeline will enable everyone 
to know whether or not the plan is on schedule.  If it is delayed, an updated timeline 
can easily be put into place.  There is also the added benefit of making it easier for 
everyone involved to determine who is responsible for what deliverables.  
Depending upon the culture of the individual law school, some aspects of the 
objective, time-referenced goals may not be necessary.  However, given the common 
challenges existing in traditional law school governance, it is generally best to 
include accountability measures before starting an implementation effort. 
 
124  To be clear, all faculty do not need to be working, or producing scholarship, on a specific 
program or project.  However, the allocation of faculty time and attention should not be left up to 
chance.  The evaluation of faculty performance should include all aspects of how the faculty 
member provides value to the law school.  
125  With respect to the strategic plan, a question could be posed by the Dean, “What have you 
done to support the implementation of the strategic plan?”  Answers from faculty could include 
examples of how they have supported the resources that further the plan. 
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 8 : 2  ( 2 0 2 0 )  
204 
3. Does Your School Align Its Operations with Its Strategic Priorities? 
Having confirmed that the implementation strategy is clearly understood, 
supported, measured and calendared within the law school, the focus can now shift 
to the actual implementation.  Indeed, strategic management literature is often 
divided between the “initial goal setting and planning stage” and an “action-
oriented, operational stage.”126   Specifically, in order to achieve the strategically 
intended benefits, law school operational resources must be deployed so as to add 
“unique value” to the school’s existing and potential “customers.”127  As discussed 
earlier in the context of vertical and horizontal fit, any successful implementation 
requires the alignment of operations with the law school’s strategic priorities.128 
In remembering why strategic priorities are so important, the implementation 
effort needs to focus on the primary decisionmaker—the individual law school 
applicant.129  Surprisingly, there is very little scholarship examining how U.S. law 
students actually select which law school to attend. 130   However, this certainly 
should not stop law schools from trying to address these goals. 
At its most fundamental level, virtually all law students come to law school to 
“develop new skills, sharpen existing skills, acquire new knowledge, and gain new 
insights.”131  Students attend law school to learn about something they either care 
about, or something they otherwise feel that they need to know (such as the 
 
126  Randall L. Schultz et al., Strategy and Tactics in a Process Model of Project Implementation, 17 
Interfaces 34, 35 (1987).  
127  Loh, supra note 49, at 4 (“Faculty and other constituents have to be mobilized to share in the 
creation and ownership of the vision, for only they can make it happen.”). 
128  Michael E. Porter, What is Strategy?, Harv. Bus. Rev. 2 (Nov.–Dec. 1996) (“Operational 
effectiveness and strategy are both essential to superior performance, which, after all, is the 
primary goal of any enterprise.”). 
129  While it may be tempting to shift focus to include all other interested “stakeholders,” such 
inclination may invite the attenuation between the law school services—education—and the 
“unique value” perceived by potential applicants.  In this regard, the only other stakeholder that 
systematically has a significant impact on the perspective of potential applicants would be the 
views of their future potential employers.  Undoubtedly, these stakeholders are very important.  
While all other stakeholders are undoubtedly important too, losing sight of the ultimate consumer 
can be potentially disastrous to any strategic plan implementation. 
130  Christopher J. Ryan, Analyzing Law School Choice, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3309815 [https://perma.cc/L3J2-B3KF] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).  But 
see a 2012 LSAC survey containing charts and data, 2012 Law School Applicant Survey, Law Sch. 
Admis. Council (2013) (on file with authors). 
131  Gerald F. Hess, Listening to Our Students: Obstructing and Enhancing in Law School, 31 U.S.F. L. 
Rev. 941, 942 (1997). 
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knowledge necessary to pass the bar) or otherwise obtain (such as the credentials 
sufficient to obtain a desired job). 
To some extent then, it is safe to assume that the individual decision to attend 
any particular law school is a function of perceived “differential expectations” about 
the individual law school offerings.132  These expectations relate to “how satisfactory 
[a particular law school] is perceived to be in enabling the decision maker[s] to 
achieve [their] explicit and implicit objectives.”133  This reduces individual law school 
attractiveness to being a function of applicant perceptions about the differential 
quality and value provided by competing law schools—as determined by the 
different wants and needs of different groups of potential law school applicants.134  
This is why the differentiation of individual law school offerings (and law school 
resources) is so important.  
Indeed, an applicant’s price sensitivity regarding an individual law school’s 
tuition cost is likely to be inversely related to the perceived distinctive and 
meaningful nature of the law school’s offering.  This is part of the problem 
presented by the combination of law school institutionalization and the U.S. News 
law school rankings.135  If an individual law school has not otherwise established a 
distinctive and meaningful market position (probably to both applicants and 
prospective employers),136 prospective applicants will have no choice but to heavily 
rely upon the published rankings to estimate the relative value of the different law 
schools.  Even if the individual schools do establish a distinctive and meaningful 
market position, experience suggests that there will still be negative enrollment 
consequences if the changes undermine bar passage rates, job placement success, 
or law school rankings.137 
Undoubtedly, some applicants may truly only value the prestige of law school 
 
132  Jagdish N. Sheth, A Model of Industrial Buyer Behavior, 37 J. of Mktg. 50, 52 (1973). 
133  Id. 
134  Cf. Barton, supra note 15, at 186–87 (An important caveat, not currently based upon any 
known data, is that the perceived attractiveness of a particular school is the result of both the 
direct perceptions of a potential applicant about the school offering and the perceptions of 
potential employers about the school offerings (as indirectly perceived by the applicant).  If this is 
true, the ability to achieve market progress will need to be communicated to both groups before 
there is any appreciable market change.). 
135  Best Law Schools, US News and World Report, https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-
schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings [https://perma.cc/7NK4-KW7M] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020). 
136  Barton, supra note 15, at 186–87. 
137  Barton, supra note 15, at 184, 187. 
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rank over the substantive characteristics of the law program.138  However, it is much 
more likely that most applicants actually value bar passage rate and job placement 
success—as indirectly reflected in the rankings.139  This reduces to the realization 
that the failure to communicate meaningful distinctiveness to both applicants and 
their future potential employers will indirectly encourage some law school 
applicants to simply continue to reference the law school rankings as a considerable 
part of their selection criteria. 
Moreover, if after looking at the rankings, law school applicants still cannot 
perceive of any meaningful difference between competing law schools, the ultimate 
selection will simply be determined by the school with the lowest cost or most 
convenience.  For this reason, rather than just bemoaning defects in the U.S. News 
law school rankings (some of which appear to be justified), individual law schools 
should use the experience as a reminder.  Law schools need to aggressively pursue 
meaningful differentiation in as many aspects as possible.  This includes operations 
as well as strategic priorities—all without undermining their bar passage or job 
placement rates.   
In the very least, partially successful differentiation will diminish some of the 
negative impacts of the rankings.  This will be hastened to the extent that a law 
school aligns its operations with its strategic priorities.  To achieve this will require 
engaged law school leadership throughout the implementation process.   
 
138  The challenge in establishing meaningful and distinctiveness to potential applicants was 
recently shown in a recent survey of 546 LSAT takers.  In that limited survey, potential law school 
applicants were asked to identify the most important characteristic in selecting a law school to 
attend.  They were given the choice of law school rank and several separate components of 
distinctiveness.  The number one choice remained law school rank.  See Paul L. Caron, Survey: 
Rankings are the Most Important Factor in Students’ Decision on Which Law School to Attend, 
TaxProfBlog (Aug. 31, 2017), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2017/08/survey-
rankings-are-most-important-factor-in-students-decision-on-which-law-school-to-attend.html 
[https://perma.cc/FNE9-5ZMG].  Additionally, in the 2012 LSAC Law School Applicant Survey, 
respondents were asked to rate the importance of various considerations on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 
5 being the most important).  The most frequently cited priorities (with a score of 4 or 5) in 
selecting any given law school were: location (77%), employment of recent graduates (73%), bar 
success (68%), clinics/internships (68%), likelihood of being admitted (66%), and then reputation 
(66%).  While it is unclear how survey respondents could have identified more distinctive 
considerations, it is clear that there can be a substantial challenge in establishing the 
distinctiveness of any given law school.  2012 Law School Applicant Survey, Law Sch. Admis. 
Council (2013) (on file with authors). 
139  See Barton, supra note 15, at 187. 
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4. Does Your School Pursue Characteristics that are Both 
“Meaningful” and “Distinctive”? 
In order for any organization—including U.S. law schools—to achieve a 
competitive advantage, it is necessary that the organization create “value in a way 
that is rare and difficult for competitors to imitate.”140  This “distinctive” challenge 
is completely separate from the determination of “meaningfulness.”  “Distinctive” 
and “meaningful” attributes do not always exist together.  In fact, more often than 
not, the two attributes exist separately. 
For example, virtually all U.S. law schools are accredited by the Council of the 
ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.141  Undoubtedly, the vast 
majority of potential law students find ABA Accreditation to be “meaningful.”142  
There is “value” in possessing ABA accreditation.  However, with 203 accredited U.S. 
law schools 143  and no other official designations, there is no obvious way that 
possessing ABA accreditation can be distinctive.144  ABA accreditation is not “rare.”  
Consequently, “[b]y nature and because of American Bar Association (ABA) 
regulation, American law schools that are not at the very top or very bottom of the 
market have herded together in virtual indistinguishability.”145  All law schools must 
have ABA Accreditation; but as a result, no individual law school can achieve much 
of any competitive advantage by virtue of it.  Accreditation is therefore meaningful 
but not distinctive. 
In fact, many law programs have similar problems and this too can undermine 
achieving the goals of any implementation effort.  Virtually all areas of legal study 
 
140  Brian Becker & Barry Gerhart, The Impact of Human Resource Management on Organizational 
Performance: Progress and Prospects, 39 The Acad. of Mgmt. J. 779, 781 (1996).  See also, e.g., Barney, 
supra note 45, at 102; Jay Barney et al., The Resource-Based View of the Firm: Ten Years After 1991, 27 J. 
of Mgmt. 625 (2001); Robert M. Grant, The Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage: 
Implications for Strategy Formulation, 33(3) Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 114 (1991); Margaret A. Peteraf, The 
Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A Resource-Based View, 14 Strategic Mgmt. J. 179 (1993).  
141  ABA-Approved Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass'n, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_
education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/ [https://perma.cc/BV2B-YFVF] (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2020). 
142  As they should.  Many states require graduation from an ABA-accredited school to be able to 
sit for the bar exam.  See Nat’l conf. of Bar Exam’rs & Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Legal Educ., 
Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 9–12 (Judith A. Gundersen et al. eds., 
2019). 
143  Although there are currently 203 ABA-accredited law schools, one of these schools is under 
provisional approval.  Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 141. 
144  Barton, supra note 15, at 180. 
145  Id. 
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are important to someone.  The question is whether they are both meaningful and 
distinctive to the relevant population of potential or existing law school students? 
With focused and sustained effort by law school leadership, otherwise meaningful 
(only) resources can eventually acquire distinctive qualities too.  Listed below are 
just a handful of examples of law school programs that have achieved some level of 
distinctiveness and meaning.  It is the position of the current paper that there needs 
to be more programs like these and that their success needs to be supported by the 
internal coordination of resources at their respective law schools as well. 
For example, consider the Cooperative Legal Education Program at 
Northeastern University School of Law.146  According to their website, Northeastern 
integrates cooperative full-time employment into its curriculum.147  This means that 
Northeastern “guarantees [students] three, full-time legal work experiences” while 
pursuing legal studies. 148   The uniqueness of the program has resulted in 
Northeastern receiving a top ranking from the National Jurist for “practical 
training.” 149   It is easy to see how the coop program would be viewed as both 
distinctive and meaningful to a significantly large number of potential law school 
applicants. 
As another example, consider the Environmental Law Specialization at 
Vermont Law School. 150   According to their website, “Since 1978, Vermont Law 
School has offered the largest and top-ranked graduate environmental law program 
in the country.  VLS offers more degrees, more certificates, more faculty, and more 
research centers than any other school focused on environmental law.”151  For 2019, 
Vermont Law School was ranked 4th (tie) in environmental law programming by 
U.S. News and World Report. 152   Given its perennial ranking at the top of 
Environmental Law programming, it is easy to see how it would be viewed as both 
distinctive and meaningful to applicants interested in environmental matters. 
Using a slightly different approach, consider how CUNY School of Law 
 
146  Experiential Learning/CO-OP, Ne. Univ. L. Sch., https://www.northeastern.edu/law/
experience/co-op/index.html [https://perma.cc/TVE3-SNVZ] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Environmental Law Specialization, Vt. L. Sch., https://www.vermontlaw.edu/academics/
specializations/environmental-law [https://perma.cc/54CP-RAQD] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
151  Id. 
152  Best Environmental Law Programs, U.S. News and World Report, https://www.usnews.com/
best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/environmental-law-rankings [https://perma.cc/Y2JF-
37LX] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
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configured their three main centers to achieve distinction in social justice: the 
Center for Latino and Latina Rights and Equality; Center for Urban Environmental 
Reform; and the Sorenson Center for International Peace and Justice.153  Additional 
offerings, such as an Immigrant and Non-Citizens Rights Clinic, clearly support the 
CUNY mission of “Law in the Service of Human Needs.”  CUNY Law has also been 
recognized as being a leading school for diversity.154  It is easy to see how CUNY 
would be viewed as both distinctive and meaningful to applicants either interested 
in social justice or coming from more diverse backgrounds than commonly found 
in other law schools. 
An example where local commerce has been used to develop a distinctive law 
program can be found at Tulane’s Center for Energy Law.155  According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, “Over 45% of total U.S. petroleum refining 
capacity is located along the Gulf coast, as well as 51% of total U.S. natural gas 
processing plant capacity.” 156   This provides a unique geographic, as well as 
economic, region in which Tulane has distinguished itself.  The mission of Tulane’s 
Center for Energy Law therefore simply states “The energy sector is going through 
a significant transition.  Law and regulation must respond to this global 
transition.”157  The center provides Tulane law students with direct opportunities to 
learn about global energy companies like Valero Energy, Blessey Marine, and 
Entergy. 158   Once again, it is easy to see how Tulane would be viewed as both 
distinctive and meaningful to applicants interested in legal issues related to the 
energy industry. 
Of course, not all law schools have access to resources that are as geographically 
distinctive as Tulane.  Based upon more general service histories, many law schools 
face greater challenges in developing distinctive and meaningful programs that 
extend beyond traditional legal education.  However, even programs that are 
 
153  Justice Centers, CUNY Sch. of L., https://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/social-justice/ 
[https://perma.cc/MA3U-6P9Y] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
154  CUNY Ranked #1 in Nation for Diversity, CUNY Sch. of L. (Feb. 5, 2019), 
http://www1.cuny.edu/mu/law/2019/02/05/1diversity/ [https://perma.cc/ZCP6-L5XA]. 
155  Tulane Center for Energy Law, Tul. UnIV., https://law.tulane.edu/centers/energy/ [https://
perma.cc/PV3A-EXSK] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
156  Gulf of Mexico Fact Sheet, U.S. Energy Information Admin., https://www.eia.gov/special/
gulf_of_mexico/ [https://perma.cc/US7G-JFBL] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
157  Tulane Center for Energy Law: Mission, Tul. Univ., https://law.tulane.edu/centers/energy/
mission [https://perma.cc/MK97-AVN7] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
158  Tulane Center for Energy Law: Student Opportunities, Tul. Univ., https://law.tulane.edu/centers/
energy/students [https://perma.cc/8ZYM-HMKM] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
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constrained to less distinct efforts can—with careful and sustained focus—develop 
uniquely successful programming. 
For example, consider the Entrepreneurship Law program at Penn State 
Dickinson Law.  This program attracts applicants who want to further current 
entrepreneurial endeavors, become entrepreneurs, or represent them in practice.  
As a starting point, the program is meaningful but not particularly distinctive.  The 
Dickinson program consists of two Entrepreneurship Law experiential courses; a 
Certificate in Entrepreneurship159; the Inside Entrepreneurship Law blog160 (that is 
professor-moderated with posts predominantly written by law students); and 
provides opportunities to engage with community entrepreneurs through 
programs such as the U.S. Small Business Association’s Boots to Business 
program.161  Individually, the components of the Dickinson Entrepreneurship Law 
program are not particularly distinctive.  However, as assembled and deployed, 
distinctive meaning has emerged for potential applicants, existing students, and 
the entrepreneurial beneficiaries of the program.162 
Within the careful configuration of the “quasi-distinctive” components, the 
blog is probably the most unique.  The Inside Entrepreneurship Law blog is the only 
one we know of that is offered by a law school with this precise format.163  The blog 
is written and maintained primarily by volunteer law students, featuring helpful 
 
159  Certificate Programs, PennState Dickinson L., https://dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/certificate-
programs [https://perma.cc/GP5N-RUK7] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020).  
160  Inside Entrepreneurship Law, PennState Dickinson L., https://sites.psu.edu/
entrepreneurshiplaw/ [https://perma.cc/N49J-FNX4] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020). 
161  Boots to Business (B2B) is an entrepreneurial education and training program offered by the 
U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) as part of the Department of Defense's Transition 
Assistance Program (TAP).  B2B provides participants with an overview of business ownership 
and is open to transitioning service members (including National Guard and Reserve) and their 
spouses.  See U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Veterans Business Development, 
https://www.sba.gov/offices/headquarters/ovbd/resources/160511 [https://perma.cc/F4FF-26KH] 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
162  Sarah Phillips, a current 3L student was recently quoted as saying: "I discovered my passion 
for business law through Dickinson Law’s entrepreneurship courses.  My legal education has 
provided me with the foundational skills necessary to help clients navigate and resolve their 
business-related legal matters and achieve their entrepreneurial goals.”  Penn State University – 
Dickinson Law (@dickinsonlaw), Instagram (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/
B5tZDZdJru6/?igshid=tygoe27g3fyn [https://perma.cc/9F6H-XYJL]. 
163  Michigan Law’s Entrepreneurship Clinic maintains a terrific startup blog with posts written 
primarily by students involved in its clinic.  See Michigan Law Entrepreneurship Clinic, 
https://entrepreneurship.law.umich.edu/blog/ [https://perma.cc/T6X5-V4GX] (last visited Feb. 4, 
2020).   
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advice from successful entrepreneurs, and designed to provide legally relevant 
information to entrepreneurs and their advisors.  Some blog topics are selected by 
student authors; 164  others are specifically requested by the Pennsylvania 
Department of Community and Economic Development.165  As implemented, the 
program is both distinctive and meaningful to a relevant population. 
Another example of a law program that originally was meaningful but not 
particularly distinctive is the Reentry Clinic at the University of Akron School of 
Law.  Typical of multiple law schools, the Reentry Clinic provides learning 
opportunities for Akron law students while also furthering the Mission of 
supporting justice.166  Typical of so many law school programs, the clinic has always 
been meaningful.  However, as implemented and developed, it has become 
distinctive too. 
Most recently, on December 3, 2019 Ohio Governor Mike DeWine announced 
the creation of a special Expedited Pardon Project for Ohio residents. 167   As 
explained by the governor: 
“There are decent people all over the state who are living in the shadow of a long-past 
and regretted mistake—people who, despite becoming law-abiding citizens, can’t get 
ahead because their criminal records are holding them back . . . .”168 
Notably, only two law schools will participate in the Expedited Pardon Project: The 
Reentry Clinic at the University of Akron School of Law and the Ohio State Moritz 
 
164  Students typically select topics of interest to them.  For example, one student wrote about 
pay secrecy and the Paycheck Fairness Act because she was marginalized at a job before she came 
to law school.  See Rachel Tunney, Let Them Know Their Worth: Pay Secrecy Policies and the Paycheck 
Fairness Act, Inside Entrepreneurship L. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://sites.psu.edu/
entrepreneurshiplaw/2019/11/25/let-them-know-their-worth-pay-secrecy-policies-and-the-
paycheck-fairness-act/ [https://perma.cc/6Z7J-Q9Q2]. 
165  The blog also features an Entrepreneur-of-the-Month who provides advice and wisdom 
through an interview-style post written by a student.  See, e.g., Elikem Tsikata, Grace Adovor 
Entrepreneur of the Month, Inside Entrepreneurship L. (Jan. 6, 2020), https://sites.psu.edu/
entrepreneurshiplaw/category/entrepreneur-of-the-month/ [https://perma.cc/9VYL-PCJR].  
Additionally, the Entrepreneur-of-the-Month typically visits the law school for a day to engage 
with students.  This feature has had direct impact on entrepreneurs seeking advice from other 
entrepreneurs—as well as delivering unique value to the law students attending Penn State 
Dickinson Law. 
166  See generally Reentry Clinic, U. of Akron Sch. of L., https://www.uakron.edu/law/curriculum/
clinical-programs/reentry.dot [https://perma.cc/DG8C-N45F] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
167  Expedited Pardon Project Created, The Daily Advoc. (Dec. 6, 2019) https://www.daily
advocate.com/news/81965/expedited-pardon-project-created [https://perma.cc/6H9T-JXEN]. 
168  Id. 
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College of Law.  This is distinctive.169 
Importantly, the distinctive success of many of the examples provided above is 
the result of sustained law school focus and investment over time.  Without this 
effort, the distinctiveness of the programs would eventually “disappear” either as 
the school shifts resources to other priorities, or as other schools mimic the 
behavior.  The problem of “disappearing” distinctiveness is demonstrated in the 
somewhat colorful story below: 
While driving through France a few years ago, my family and I were enchanted by the 
hundreds of storybook cows grazing in lovely pastures right next to the road. For dozens 
of kilometers, we all gazed out the window, marveling at the beauty. Then, within a few 
minutes, we started ignoring the cows. The new cows were just like the old cows, and 
what was once amazing was now common. Worse than common: It was boring.  
Cows, after you've seen them for a while, are boring. They may be well-bred cows, Five 
Sigma cows, cows lit by a beautiful light, but they are still boring. A Purple Cow, though: 
Now, that would really stand out. The essence of the Purple Cow—the reason it would 
shine among a crowd of perfectly competent, even undeniably excellent cows—is that it 
would be remarkable. Something remarkable is worth talking about, worth paying 
attention to. Boring stuff quickly becomes invisible.170 
In this same way, consider how U.S. law schools often fail to present any 
uniqueness regarding their respective programs.  To conduct your own test of this, 
go to the list of the websites of AALS member schools.  It is available at 
www.AALS.org/member-schools/.  Then do as follows: 
Just randomly click on any two law schools on the list that are not one [of the top twenty 
or so law schools] . . . just start clicking and scrolling through.  I promise that if you cover 
up the names of the school and the geographic location and just read the descriptions, 
you will have a very, very hard time figuring out which law school you are reading about. 
The faculties basically look the same . . . The curricula look basically identical same first-
year classes, same upper-level mix of bread-and-butter classes . . . same claims of clinical 
and externship offerings that will produce “practice-ready” graduates, and similar 
random seminars based on the interests of the tenured faculty . . . .171 
The same rule that applies to cows also applies to law schools.  If they are unable to 
 
169  But see Barton, supra note 15, at 181, where Barton suggests that distinctiveness is linked to 
data “suggesting that graduates obtain jobs in the specialty.”  While supporting data are certainly 
helpful, the authors would suggest that even lacking these traits that their examples are 
distinctive too. 
170  Seth Godin, In Praise of the Purple Cow, Fast Company (Dec. 19, 2007), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/67/purplecow.html [https://perma.cc/DB79-EKDY] (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2020). 
171  Barton, supra note 15, at 180.  While these offerings may not be completely identical, they are 
marketed in rather similar fashion on the law school websites. 
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achieve any distinctive and meaningful position, they might as well be invisible.  To 
be successful, any implementation effort must plan accordingly and provide for 
sustained focus and the necessary resources. 
Aside from the challenges in achieving and sustaining distinctiveness, some 
law schools sometimes stumble into a slightly different problem.  The law school 
pursues a resource that is meaningful and distinctive—just not to the relevant 
population. 
For example, assume that Law School “A” has identified a segment of potential 
law students that are enthusiastically committed to supporting environmental 
activism and practicing environmental law.  This segment of potential students 
would prioritize environmental law offerings in deciding where to apply to law 
school.  Assume that Law School “A” has the other resources and a reputation in this 
area that would enable Law School “A” to successfully recruit these environmentally 
focused students.  For Law School “A,” it certainly would be beneficial and 
appropriate to hire a law faculty member who has expertise as an environmental 
lawyer and activist.  
In stark contrast, consider a different law school—Law School “B”.  Assume the 
faculty at Law School “B” believe in the importance of environmental activism.  
However, unlike Law School “A,” assume that Law School “B” does not have students 
who share this view and does not have any available resources or ability to recruit 
environmentally active students.  Unlike Law School “A,” without more, Law School 
“B” should not expend resources to hire a law faculty member who has expertise as 
an environmental lawyer and activist.  Unlike Law School “A,” the environmental 
lawyer and activist is not meaningful to the relevant population—the existing or 
potential students of Law School “B.”172  
To a large extent, this example highlights the insidious problem presented by 
one law school simply mimicking the “best practices” of other law schools.  Often, 
mimicry ignores critical differences between the organizations.  In the process, one 
law school may unnecessarily consume scarce resources while failing to create any 
value for the school’s existing or potential students.  As explained earlier, there are 
multiple ways that institutionalized law schools lose focus regarding these realities.  
It is only through the sustained leadership and focus by both the Dean and widely-
respected faculty members that the full promise of the strategic plan can be 
 
172  Of course, this example is not intended to single-out environmental law faculty.  The same 
concepts apply with equal force whenever resources are expended without direct reference to the 
actual or perceived value of the investment to the relevant population—the existing or potential 
students at the respective law school. 
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achieved.173 
Consequently, beyond just aligning operations with its strategic plan, law 
schools must be careful in how they invest and develop their resources.  To be a 
source of competitive advantage, a resource must be both distinctive and 
meaningful.174  Even if a resource is initially both distinctive and meaningful, it is 
necessary that the distinctiveness be sustained through continued focus and 
investment. 175   Additionally, even resources that are both distinctive and 
meaningful must be so to the correct relevant group—existing and potential 
students.  To achieve these goals requires the sustained support of law school 
leadership.  Otherwise, the established mechanisms for institutionalization will 
persist and the distinctiveness of any law school accomplishment will eventually 
disappear—assuming they ever exist in the first place.  
C. Modeling the Impact of Faculty Alignment on Implementation Success 
Throughout this article, a central claim has been that the optimal ability of U.S. 
law schools to achieve distinctive and meaningful change requires both faculty 
engagement and law school leadership.  This is necessary to achieve the maximum 
faculty alignment with the law school’s strategic plan.176  An underlying question is 
therefore how “complete” faculty alignment needs to be in order to substantially 
achieve the intended strategic goals?  To find out, a Monte Carlo simulation was 
created and then tested on several different scenarios involving different degrees of 
faculty alignment. 
 
173  This applies equally to both Stage 6 and Stage 7 of the Process Model. 
174  Of course, combining cows and law schools would not accomplish anything either.  A law 
school having a purple cow certainly would be distinctive but would hopefully be meaningless to 
any relevant population.  
175  Even if a law school adopts an outstanding innovation, it will likely take time for the benefits 
to appear in the form of improved employment prospects for graduates.  See Campbell supra note 
2, at 360–61.  Campbell relays the story of the focused strategy of Peking University’s School of 
Transnational Law (where students receive a JD degree based on a U.S. style law school curriculum 
and a JM degree based on a Chinese graduate curriculum).  Id.  “Employers seeking students ready 
to step into sophisticated transnational Asian rim practice could not find as deep and talented a 
pool anywhere else.  Students seeking to engage in transnational practice could not find as 
focused an offering or as extensive a network of fellow students and future alumni anywhere else.  
The school graduated its first class in 2012, and those graduates had to overcome the lack of 
established placement pipelines, absence of STL alumni in hiring positions, and undeveloped 
brand awareness.”  Id. 
176  See generally Frank T. Read, The Unique Role of the Law School Dean in American Legal Education, 
51 J. Legal Educ. 392 (2001). 
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A Monte Carlo Simulation is “a useful technique for modeling and analyzing 
real-world systems and situations.” 177   A “Monte Carlo simulation uses random 
sampling and statistical modeling to estimate mathematical functions and mimic 
the operations of complex systems.” 178   For current purposes, the Monte Carlo 
Simulation consisted of modelling the expected law school performance given 
varying degrees of aligned/unaligned behavior by the individual law school’s faculty 
members.  
Conceptually, the actual success or failure of a law school implementation effort 
will be a function of the overall faculty support and cooperation in pursuing given 
strategic priorities.  This same question also can be framed as merely representing 
the extent of organizational success in cooperatively achieving effective vertical and 
horizontal fit.  In either case, the inputs represent the various degrees of faculty 
alignment with the given strategic goals. The outputs represent the composite, 
resulting, law school performances. 
As a starting point in determining how to further conceptualize the basic 
problem, it is instructive to consider how both the general law faculty and law school 
leadership would answer the same identical question: To what extent will you 
actively support the implementation of the strategic plan?  When framed in this 
way, the basic conditions likely to impact faculty alignment presents as a “2x2” 
matrix corresponding to how each—the general faculty and law school leadership—
effectively responds to the question.  
 
 
 
177  Young Hoon Kwak & Lisa Ingall, Exploring Monte Carlo Simulation Applications for Project 
Management, 9 Risk Mgmt. 44, 44 (2007).  
178  Robert L. Harrison, Introduction to Monte Carlo Simulation, AIP Conf. Proc. (Jan. 1, 2010) 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2924739/pdf/nihms219206.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DKM9-H6UW].  
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However, looking more closely, it is unclear whether or not there would be any 
difference in the extent or nature of faculty alignment between quadrants B - 
“yes/no” and C - “no/yes.”  With no rational basis to distinguish between these two 
situations, it was decided that these two quadrants could be tested together.  
In determining if the model could be improved further, it was unclear how 
(given the absence of any data) to separately model either leadership or faculty 
engagement.  For this reason, the decision was made to simply manipulate the 
varying degrees of individual faculty alignment as reflecting the overall success or 
failure of the engagement/leadership process.  Greater success would be reflected 
by input with greater individual faculty alignment to the goals of the modelled law 
school; less success would be reflected by input with less individual faculty 
alignment to the goals of the modelled law school.  Faculty “alignment” would be 
varied based upon the number of similar or identical intended priorities by faculty 
within the modelled law school.  From this input, representing all the faculty within 
the given law school, the law school performance output would be calculated as 
representing the composite average result of the decisions of all the individual 
faculty members.  
From the matrix above and related discussion, the model was tested using three 
different scenarios.  The first scenario estimated the distinctive law school output 
where there was neither faculty engagement nor law school leadership 
(corresponding to quadrant “A” in the matrix).  The second scenario estimated 
distinctive law school output where one of two situations existed.  Either the general 
faculty supported an effort but not the law school leadership (corresponding to 
quadrant “B” in the matrix); or, the general faculty did not support the effort but the 
law school leadership did support it (corresponding to “C” in the matrix).  The third 
scenario estimated law school output where both the general faculty and law school 
leadership supported the implementation process (corresponding to “D” in the 
matrix).  
Next, in order to develop a measure of faculty performance, recall that most 
U.S. law schools only evaluate the performance of individual law faculty members 
across scholarship, teaching, and service.  Although these measures present serious 
concerns about lack of horizontal fit relating to measuring relevant performance, 
the decision was made to replicate this common reality in the basic model. 179  
Therefore, each law faculty member was presumed to perform across values in three 
 
179  Please note that the somewhat obtuse relationship between the implementation goals and 
the separate average measures for scholarship, teaching and service reflects a common reality at 
many U.S. law schools while also highlighting the likely lack of horizontal fit between faculty 
performance evaluation and law school implementation success. 
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separate categories: scholarship, teaching and service.  Furthermore, it was 
generally assumed that each law faculty member possessed and applied the same 
amount of total energy equal to “9” units.180  Each individual faculty member was 
presumed to be able to distribute their “9” units according to their own intentions 
across the three categories.  For instance, a faculty member could decide to be 
perfectly balanced in their efforts and intend values of 3-3-3 for scholarship, 
teaching and service. 
Next, the model converted the nominal “intended” performance value for each 
individual faculty member, in each of the three categories, into the modelled “actual 
performance” values.  This was achieved by using the inverse function of the 
cumulative normal distribution.181  A randomly generated probability (between 0 
and 1) was used, along with the pre-determined “intended” value as the mean of the 
distribution (with standard deviation set at 1).  The resulting value was the modelled 
individual “actual performance.”  
Functionally the calculation of the individual “actual performance” was 
equivalent to simply asking, if you have an intended given value, “X,” with a normal 
distribution and standard deviation of 1, what would be the observed value on this 
distribution if you randomly selected the cumulative probability of “P” on that 
distribution?  For example, if the cumulative probability were exactly 0.5, then the 
value would be exactly in the middle of the normal curve and the observed value 
would be the same thing as the mean, or “X.”  In this way, random variation was 
statistically modelled based upon the individual faculty member’s intended 
output.182  This process was repeated for each individual faculty member for each of 
their three categories.  Additional steps were then taken to ensure that the total of 
the three categories equaled “9.”183 
 
180  The selection of the value of “9” for energy was for convenience purposes given that there 
were three categories that each faculty member could allocate across.  The selection of this 
number has absolutely no impact on the relative results of the model. 
181  This conversion of the individual intended priorities to actual performance was 
accomplished by embedding input value to the NORMINV function in Microsoft Excel 2019.  The 
variation was accomplished by setting the standard deviation equal to 1, and the probability being 
determined by an embedded RAND function. 
182  For instance, if an individual intended a teaching value of “6,” the model calculated a random 
number representing the “actual” value performed by the individual.  This number was based 
upon a normal distribution, with a population mean of “6” and standard deviation of “1.”  The 
actual calculation was achieved in Excel 2019 using the function, NORMINV(RAND(),µ,σ). 
183  Where the randomly generated values did not initially total 9, the individual values across 
each of the three categories was converted into a fraction with the numerator equaling the 
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For simplicity purposes, each law school was assumed to have only ten (10) 
individual faculty members.  As explained above, the model potentially permitted 
each of these ten (10) faculty members to individually select their own “intended” 
values as to scholarship, teaching and service.  Faculties that were more aligned with 
the organization’s strategic goals had more faculty members who selected the same 
priorities.  For instance, a perfectly aligned law school would have all ten (10) faculty 
members pick the same respective values in each of the three categories.  However, 
in order to reflect some faculty members not aligning with strategic goals, some 
individual priorities (in appropriately selected scenarios) sometimes applied three 
completely random values (still totaling “9” across all three categories).  Other times, 
as noted in the scenario, different but specifically intended values were 
intentionally set to represent other “defecting” faculty members.  
The law school’s subsequent “performance” for each iteration was represented 
by calculating the composite average of the modelled “actual performance” 
outcomes in each category across all ten (10) individual faculty members.184  Each 
scenario, keeping all basic faculty inputs the same, was then repeated 10,000 times.  
The resulting average law school performance (and other statistical values) was then 
recorded reflecting impact of different aligned/unaligned intended individual 
inputs.185  
1. Scenario 1: Neither Faculty Alignment Nor Leadership 
This scenario, corresponding to quadrant “A” in the Basic Matrix, represents 
the likely outcomes if neither the law school leadership nor general faculty engage 
in any part of the strategic plan implementation.  In order to approximate the 
absence of any consistent control, each of the ten (10) individual law school faculty 
were permitted to randomly vary across all values of scholarship, teaching, and 
service.  The only restriction was that, for each individual faculty member, the total 
units across the three areas still had to equal “9.”186  The process was then repeated 
10,000 times and the long-run average for law school performance was calculated 
for scholarship, teaching and service.  The result was as follows: 
 
 
individual random number and the denominator equaling the total of all three random numbers.  
The resulting fraction was then multiplied by 9. 
184  The selection of ten (10) faculty members was merely for convenience purposes.  It was 
assumed that ten faculty members would provide enough potential variation to make the model 
somewhat representative of typical law school faculty. 
185  Comprehensive summary descriptive statistics are included at the end of this article. 
186  See supra, note 183, for an explanation of adjustment mechanism. 
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#1 10,000 Iterations, L.S. W/10 Faculty, All Random 
L.S. Avg. Scholarship L.S. Avg. Teaching L.S. Avg. Service 
2.56 3.43 3.01 
Std. Dev. of Scholarship Std. Dev. of Teaching Std. Dev. of Service 
0.26 0.27 0.27 
Max. L.S. Scholarship Max. L.S. Teaching Max. School Service 
3.64 4.55 4.14 
Min. School Scholarship Min. School Teaching Min. School Service 
1.65 2.37 2.08 
 
Where individual faculty values were completely free to randomly vary, after 
10,000 iterations, the highest composite law school values (on a scale of 0 – 9) for 
Scholarship, Teaching, and Service were 3.64, 4.55, and 4.14, respectively.  Looking 
at the calculated composite (mean) values for the law schools, the individual 
category values only varied from 2.56 to 3.43.  Presumably, these values all would 
have been closer to “3” if the law schools had been modelled with more than 10 
faculty members.    According to this Monte Carlo Simulation, if there is no 
engagement or leadership, the law school performance averages clearly all tend 
toward decidedly non-distinct average values of “3.” 
To provide further testing of the first scenario, the model was then run where 
the intended input priorities for each of the ten (10) law faculty was specifically set 
at “3” in all categories (but still subject to individual random variation).  This 
situation would reflect the unlikely situation where the law school intentionally 
wanted to achieve thoroughly “average” performances.  The results where as 
expected with all organizational measures also essentially being “3”: 
 
#1 10,000 Iterations, L. Schools W/10 Faculty, All 333 
L.S. Avg. Scholarship L.S. Avg. Teaching L.S. Avg. Service 
3.01 3.00 2.99 
Std. Dev. of Scholarship Std. Dev. of Teaching Std. Dev. of Service 
0.27 0.27 0.28 
Max. L.S. Scholarship Max. L.S. Teaching Max. L.S. Service 
4.10 4.04 4.00 
Min. L.S. Scholarship Min. L.S. Teaching Min. L.S. Service 
1.81 2.03 1.62 
 
Comparing the results of the two runs, it appears that providing neither 
leadership nor any faculty engagement will lead to results similar to intentionally 
seeking mediocre law school performance.  This suggests that the failure of both the 
general faculty and law school leadership to participate in the strategic plan 
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execution essentially guarantees a non-descript “average” outcome.  This also 
highlights likely problems caused by omitting consideration of vertical and 
horizontal fit.  In all of these instances, law schools will behave as if they have no 
strategy at all.  
With the possible (but highly unlikely) exception where the individual law 
school’s strategic plan actually indicates the desirability of “average” performance, 
this scenario underscores the risk of failing to effectively manage the 
implementation process.  These would be the same expected results as if the 
implementation was never even attempted. 
2. Scenario 2: Incomplete Faculty Alignment and Leadership 
This scenario corresponds with quadrants “B” and “C” in the Basic Matrix.  The 
scenario represents the likely outcomes if either the general faculty engage or the 
leadership engage—but not both.  In both situations, it was assumed that some 
portion of the faculty would attempt to align their priorities while others would 
defect to pursue their own interests.  The only question was whether the faculty 
would defect randomly to pursue other interests, or specifically target distinct other 
interests. 
The first Monte Carlo simulation for this scenario permitted three of the ten 
faculty to individually vary on a purely random basis in their prioritization of 
scholarship, teaching and service.  Moreover, it was assumed that the seven 
coordinated faculty collectively selected somewhat distinctive performance goals.  
The seven faculty were presumed to pursue a moderately high scholarship focus 
(with scholarship=6, teaching=2 and service=1).  Of course, for the purpose of this 
simulation, the high scholarship focus was also assumed to reflect the particular 
characteristics necessary to implement the law school’s strategic plan and to deliver 
distinctive and meaningful value.  The results of this model were as follows: 
 
#1 10,000 Iterations, L.S. W/10 Faculty, 7 – 6/2/1, 3 – Random 
L.S. Avg. Scholarship L.S. Avg. Teaching L.S. Avg. Service 
5.55 2.05 1.41 
St. Dev. of Scholarship Std. Dev. of Teaching Std. Dev. of Service 
0.30 0.26 0.25 
Max. L.S. Scholarship Max. L.S. Teaching Max. School Service 
6.85 3.11 2.49 
Min. School Scholarship Min. School Teaching Min. School Service 
4.39 1.08 0.46 
 
What is most notable about the results of this model run is the impact of 
permitting just three “independent” faculty members to randomly pursue their own 
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interests.  Even though the seven remaining faculty members pursued, lock-step, 
clearly defined goals (scholarship=6, teaching=2, service=1), the average scholarship 
performance was still visibly distorted downward.  Additionally, the maximum 
observed value for scholarship was only 6.85 across 10,000 iterations.  However, as 
a counterbalance, the average value for service was visibly increased upwards. 
In order to test the impact of focused (rather than random) defection of three 
faculty members, the “6, 2, 1” model was re-run.  As before, seven (7) faculty members 
pursued the “6,2,1” priorities.  This time, however, the three (3) faculty members 
pursued an alternative, focused, priority of “2,5,2.”  This could approximate what 
would happen when three divergent faculty members decide to pursue an approach 
using moderate teaching priorities.  The impact of the clearly focused dissident 
approach on the modelled composite law school performance was as follows: 
 
10,000 Iterations, L.S. W/10 Faculty, 7 – 6/2/1, 3 – 252 
L.S. Avg. Scholarship L.S. Avg. Teaching L.S. Avg. Service 
4.81 2.88 1.31 
Std. Dev. Avg. Scholarship Std. Dev. of Teaching Std. Dev. of Service 
0.30 0.28 0.26 
Max. L.S. Scholarship Max. L.S. Teaching Max. School Service 
6.04 4.04 2.31 
Min. School Scholarship Min. School Teaching Min. School Service 
3.73 1.82 0.36 
 
Under these circumstances, the impact of the three focused, divergent faculty 
members had an even greater impact on the resulting law school performance.  This 
time, the composite scholarship performance (both average and maximum) was 
reduced even further away from the intended distinctive target.  The composite 
teaching performance was increased away from the intended distinctive target too.  
Of course, the actual impact of a focused, divergent faculty will depend upon the 
differences between the intended law school distinctive goals and the divergent 
goals.  However, the tendency appears—in varying degrees—to be a central 
convergence toward more “average” performance.  Values that were intended to be 
higher are reduced; values that were intended to be lower are increased.  In the 
process, the actual performance of the law school simply becomes less distinct and 
more “average.”  
3. Scenario 3: Complete Faculty Alignment and Leadership 
In order to determine if distinctive law school performance was actually 
achievable, the model was re-run with all ten (10) faculty members pursuing the 
same distinctive goal of “6”, “2” and “1”.  Given the higher, focused, participation of 
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all faculty, the intended individual goals translated into the long-run law school 
performance that effectively met the intended goals:  
 
#1 10,000 Iterations, L.S. W/10 Faculty, All 6/2/1 
L.S. Avg. Scholarship L.S. Avg. Teaching L.S. Avg. Service 
6.03 1.94 1.03 
Std. Dev. of Scholarship Std. Dev. of Teaching Std. Dev. of Service 
0.30 0.27 0.25 
Max. L.S. Scholarship Max. L.S. Teaching Max. School Service 
7.22 2.90 2.11 
Min. School Scholarship Min. School Teaching Min. School Service 
4.86 0.79 0.23 
 
Lastly, resources permitting, it was assumed that many law schools might be 
interested in achieving even more extreme, distinctive, performances.  The model 
was run one last time with all faculty targeting extreme scholarship performance 
coded as (scholarship=9, teaching=0, service=0).  This essentially set the model with 
one value at the maximum level and two values at the minimum value.  Nonetheless, 
each value still represented the only mean of the distribution.  Therefore, it was 
foreseeable that the transformations might occasionally result in non-extreme 
values.  This was supported by the following results: 
 
#1 10,000 Iterations, L.S. W/10 Faculty, All 9/0/0 
L.S. Avg. Scholarship L.S. Avg. Teaching L.S. Avg. Service 
8.29 0.36 0.36 
St. Dev. Avg. Scholarship Std. Dev. of Teaching Std. Dev. of Service 
0.21 0.16 0.16 
Max. L.S. Scholarship Max. L.S. Teaching Max. School Service 
8.94 1.02 1.02 
Min. School Scholarship Min. School Teaching Min. School Service 
7.40 0.00 0.00 
 
As expected, the modelled law school performances exhibited the intended 
results with minimal distortion at the extreme values.  The extreme example 
established that law schools with fully aligned faculty could successfully achieve 
even the most extreme strategic goals.  The real limitation was in the ability of 
individual law schools to align their faculty behavior. 
4. Implications of the Different Scenario Outcomes 
In looking across the various Monte Carlo simulations, one thing that clearly 
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emerges is that (as expected) the failure of faculty to align with strategic priorities 
undermines achieving organizational priorities.  What we further glean is that the 
actual impact on law school performance due to the lack of faculty alignment 
depends upon: 1) the intended “distinctiveness” of the strategic goals; 2) the extent 
of “sub-alignment” of the dissident faculty members; and 3) the extent of difference 
between the strategic goals and the goals of the dissident faculty members.  
Generally speaking, the greater the intended distinctiveness of the implementation 
process, the greater its sensitivity to faculty alignment. 
Without meaningful faculty engagement and law school leadership, 
implementation efforts will be less successful.  Without special care, individual law 
schools will remain invisible.  The long-run performance of U.S. law schools will 
tend to continue clustering in a nondescript central position.  “The truth is that 
implementation demands ownership at all levels of management.” 187   This is 
especially true of U.S. law schools. 
C ONC L US I ON 
Without any doubt, U.S. law schools need to adapt better, faster, and more 
distinctively.  In pursuit of this goal, the earlier article focused on how law schools 
can formulate distinctive and meaningful strategies.  But law schools also need to 
execute their strategies by properly deploying their resources.  Implementation is 
necessary.  
In the present article, the Resource Based View and Strategic Human Resource 
Management were used to identify the theoretical challenges to, and mechanisms 
supporting, a successful implementation.  Specific reference was made to the need 
to establish vertical fit in hiring law faculty and to assure horizontal fit through 
appropriate faculty evaluation criteria.  
Next, the article clarified that the implementation process should start with a 
strategy that is clearly understood and supported by faculty and leadership alike.  
The implementation process should have objective goals containing individual 
accountability and a clear timeline.  The implementation process should assure that 
law school operations align with the strategic priorities.  And, law schools should 
prioritize resources that are both distinctive and meaningful to the relevant 
population of existing and potential students.  
Lastly, a Monte Carlo simulation tested how different degrees of faculty 
alignment with strategic priorities might impact the resulting law school 
performances.  The results suggest that the absence of any faculty alignment largely 
 
187  Hrebiniak, supra note 29, at 13. 
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guarantees mediocre “average” results.  At the other extreme, strong faculty 
alignment is essential to successfully achieve any distinctive change.  Real 
commitment is necessary. 
All told, the article concludes that U.S. law schools can successfully implement 
distinctive and meaningful strategic plans within existing shared governance 
structures.  However, success clearly requires the full engagement and leadership 
by both the faculty and the Dean.  It requires sustained operational support for 
strategic change.  It also requires the improved, active, management of law school 
resources.   
But most importantly, before any individual U.S law school can implement an 
otherwise distinctive and meaningful strategic plan, there must first be a 
cooperative will and commitment to change. 
 
